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Abstract 
 
Collusion, as a highly profitable crime with severe consequences to society, has 
attracted the attention of many economic researchers. While most subjects have already 
been extensively debated in the collusion literature, we provide new insights on topics 
that have been rarely addressed and whose solutions are yet to be discovered. This 
dissertation is composed by a literature review, two theoretical chapters and one 
empirical work. 
The first chapter is a historical analysis of some important contributions to collusion 
literature. It is our purpose to illustrate how the evolution of game theory has changed 
our understanding about the strategic interaction between the members of cartels.  
The second chapter studies the economic effects of cooperative wage fixing in 
industries with a single input. We establish a deterministic relation between collusion in 
the labor market and collusion in the product market and we show that both types of 
collusion lead to higher prices, lower wages, lower employment and smaller quantities 
transacted, due to the elimination of the business and labor force stealing effects.  
The third chapter extends the previous analysis to industries that use two types of labor. 
We consider a two-stage game where firms hire non-specialized workers for an 
exogenous wage and specialized workers whose wages can be cooperatively 
determined. It is shown that semi-collusion in the labor market has the same qualitative 
results than complete collusion, although new dynamic effects and strategies are found. 
In the forth chapter we develop an empirical method to detect price collusion from the 
observation of economic data. Our approach describes the supply side of the industry as 
a switching regression with two regimes, collusion and competition, which is estimated 
using a modified expectation-maximization algorithm. We use simulated data to show 
that our algorithm accurately predicts collusion and consistently estimates the 
parameters of the switching regression. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
Theory of games and collusion 
From cooperative games to non-cooperative games 
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1.1. Introduction 
The creation of cartels has been for a long time a major concern for economists, due to 
the severe effects that anticompetitive practices as artificial increases in prices, output 
restrictions and division of markets have on the efficiency of the economy and on social 
welfare. Indeed, the phenomenon of collusion was already warned by Adam Smith in 
1776, who stated that: 
“People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices.
1” 
This concern has raised in most countries the creation of several antitrust laws (as the 
Sherman Act approved in 1890 in the United States) as well as the creation of 
competition authorities responsible to prosecute collusive practices. However, the most 
important contributions to the economic literature on the theory of collusion would only 
come much later. 
Because collusion commonly occurs in oligopolistic industries composed by a small 
number of large firms, it could not be properly investigated using, for example, the 
general equilibrium paradigm, where markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. 
Instead, it was only after the creation of a theory of games in the mid-twentieth century 
that it was possible to investigate how the strategic interaction between firms lead to the 
creation of a cartel and to analyze several other key issues: How do firms coordinate 
cooperative strategies compatible with rational behavior? Which firms of the industry 
compose the cartel? How do cartelized firms distribute profits among them? Under what 
conditions collusion can be sustained? Can firms collude without being able to 
communicate with each other? What is the role of competition authorities? 
In order to answer all these questions, many years of theoretical development were 
required and, above all, it took a deep evolution of the economic thought about the 
cooperative nature of collusion. While in the initial state of theory collusion was 
considered a cooperative game between firms (as our intuition would suggest), it turned 
out that in some components of a collusive game firms cannot collaborate with each 
                                                   
1
 Quoted from An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
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other. And the continuous changes in the economic environment and regulation along 
time caused economists to increasingly study collusion as a non-cooperative game. 
The purpose of this chapter is thus to illustrate how has collusion theory evolved from 
the use of cooperative games to non-cooperative games and how that 
theoretical/methodological evolution affects our scientific knowledge on the subject. 
This will be done according to the following structure:  
In Section 1.3 we briefly present the theory of games as it was originally developed by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1943, which focuses mainly on games where 
coalitions are formed and at least some players cooperate with each other. We discuss 
the main contributions of this theory to the study of cartels and, withal, how it fails to 
solve some essential issues. 
In Section 1.4 we study the context in which the concept of Nash equilibrium or non-
cooperative equilibrium was introduced and, in particular, we show how this concept 
was applied to cooperative games to overcome some imperfections of the last theory. At 
this point, while collusion is still studied by economic science as a cooperative game, 
the economic literature uses the Nash equilibrium to solve the conflicting interests that 
arise at some stages of the game in which firms are not able to cooperate with each 
other. 
In Section 1.5 we discuss the ongoing changes in the economic environment that caused 
firms to increasingly coordinate their collusive strategies without talking or meeting (the 
so called informal cartels). This led some economists to investigate the conditions under 
which collusion can be sustained without communication or enforceable agreements, 
initiating thereby the research of non-cooperative collusion that currently dominates 
economic literature. 
For now, in Section 1.2, we define some important concepts that we have already used 
so far, but whose precise meaning is crucial for a rigorous discussion about the 
historical evolution of collusion theory. 
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1.2. Terminology 
The first concept to be defined is naturally our object of study. In the economic sense, 
collusion consists in any explicit or tacit agreement between firms to raise prices, 
restrain the output produced, divide markets or follow any other anti-competitive 
practice that increases the profits of the industry at the expense of social welfare. This 
economic definition embraces both formal cartels where firms actually meet and 
undertake with each other, as well as informal cartels in which firms can only 
communicate through the mechanisms of the market. 
In addition to our central concept we must provide some notions in game theory. 
Briefly, a game is a set of rules that defines what moves or actions can be executed by 
each player at each stage. The rules of the game also associate any sequence of moves 
with a payoff or outcome per player. In particular we are interested in the notions of  
cooperative and non-cooperative game, which differ by the fact that in the former 
players are free to communicate, make enforceable agreements and to do side payments 
outside the rules of the game.  
During the course of a game it is common to define a strategy, which consists in a set of 
rules describing how a particular player should behave in every possible situation that 
might arise. Notice that in opposition to the unbreakable rules of the game that define 
the legal and illegal actions, strategies are only guides that suggest the execution of a 
specific action among all possible actions. 
At last, the solution of the game is the set of strategies that players are likely to choose 
when they behave rationally. Sometimes the term solution is used to express the 
distribution of payoffs that results from all players taking their optimal strategies. This 
is the concept of solution as a set of imputations defined by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1943). 
We have now the necessary tools to start our journey. Any other technical concepts that 
may be used throughout Chapter 1 will be defined at the appropriate time. 
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1.3. The contribution of cooperative games to collusion theory 
Modern game theory is based on one of the most important mathematical works ever, 
the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, written by John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern and published for the first time in 1944 by the Princeton University Press. 
This book, which was created after a theory developed and published in 1928 by the 
former author, has introduced the tools of modern logic in economics, according to the 
Journal of Political Economics, and was admired by “the audacity of vision, the 
perseverance in details, and the depth of thought displayed in almost every page” by the 
American Economic Review. 
It is not clear why John von Neumann, a brilliant mathematician with so many 
important contributions to mathematics, physics and computer sciences, was concerned 
in creating a theory of games applied to economic and social problems. Perhaps his 
motivation can partially be explained from the fact that, having born on 1903 in 
Budapest, he lived his youth in wartimes and in contact with several games specifically 
designed for military schools (like Kriegspiel), where the prediction of the moves and 
strategies of the other players is extremely important. In addition to his contact with 
strategic war games, according to William Poundstone “The nominal inspiration for 
game theory was poker, a game von Neumann played occasionally and not especially 
well”. Indeed, unlike other luck games as blackjack and roulette where probability 
theory alone can be used to optimize gains, poker players must account not only for the 
odds but also for the information they reveal with certain actions (which they can avoid 
by bluffing). A poker player who always bets high when he has a good hand and bets 
low otherwise is quickly found out by his opponents and can easily be beaten. 
The fact that Von Neumann foresaw a formal theory with wide applications just from 
the observation of games where the actions of players depend on one another required 
an enormous talent. And his premature genius becomes evident taking into account that 
he received advanced instruction in mathematics from private tutors during his 
childhood, he got a PhD in mathematics with only 22 years at the Pázmány Péter 
University in Budapest and, in 1930, he was one of the first four people being selected 
to the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, along with Albert Einstein. 
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The application of theory of games to economic problems and the use of economic 
concepts as utility, rational behavior and perfect/ imperfect information were largely 
due to the collaboration of Oskar Morgenstern, an economist born in German on 1902, 
graduated in the University of Vienna in 1925 and doctorate in political science. After 
graduating, Morgenstern became interested on the analyses of what he called “live 
variables”, that is, variables that depend on the economic actions and decisions of other 
agents. Among several studies, he investigated the effects of predictions on the 
predicted events and created an example where he showed that the intellectual battle 
between Sherlock Holmes and Professor Moriarty could not be solved with an infinite 
reasoning of the type “Sherlock Holmes predicts that Professor Moriarty predicts that 
Sherlock Holmes predicts…” and, instead, it could only be solved with an arbitrary 
decision. It was during the presentation of these problems in the Karl Menger’s 
colloquium that Morgenstern was approached by the mathematician Edward Čech, who 
remarked the strong connection between his ideas and those presented on a paper 
published in 1928 by John von Neumann. And, when Morgenstern came to the United 
States in 1938, one of the main reasons why he accepted so quickly the invitation from 
Princeton University to lecture political economy was precisely his desire to meet and 
interact with von Neumann. It didn’t take long until the economist and the 
mathematician initiated the joint creation of one of the most important works of their 
life, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. 
The theory presented by von Neumann and Morgenstern focus in the resolution of 
cooperative games, where coalitions are typically formed by players. Although the 
authors do not explicit clarify why they are particularly interested in cooperative games, 
we can conjecture by putting ourselves in their position. Anyone who shall create a new 
and innovative theory from scratch should attempt to do it as general as possible and the 
authors had absolutely no reason to suppose that, in most relevant games, players could 
not freely communicate nor sign enforceable contracts, given the society they lived 
based on freedom and private property. Besides, because players can always improve or 
maintain their payoffs by cooperating with each other (in the worst case players choose 
the same strategies they would if they were not able to cooperate), it would be 
completely irrational not to attempt to form coalitions. Finally, their theoretical analysis 
of cooperative games may simply have resulted from the evidence they observed in 
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some important strategic “games” like wars. In World War II we do not observe 
numerous countries fighting each other in a complete anarchy, but the formation of two 
big coalitions: the allies and the axis powers.  
We have shown the historical conditions that led to the creation of an authentic 
masterpiece on the theory of games and, specifically, on the theory of cooperative 
games. Now we must question how this theory can be used to find the solution of a 
game and to increase our knowledge about collusion. 
When using the term solution, von Neumann and Morgenstern usually mean a set of 
imputations, that is, the set of all possible distributions of payoffs that are likely to occur 
in a specific game. In order to find the set of imputations that correspond to the solution 
of the game, the authors apply the principle of dominance. Despite not having the time 
to explain here the mathematical concept of domination, we can provide a simple 
intuitive notion: we say that an imputation   dominates an imputation   if there are a 
sufficient number of players strictly preferring   to   and if those players are able to 
enforce the imputation   to the other players of the game. 
If the concept of domination was transitive, the solution of the game would become 
trivial and it would simply correspond to the set of imputations that dominate all the 
others. Unfortunately that is not the case, as it is possible that an imputation   
dominates an imputation  , which dominates an imputation  , which in turn dominates 
the initial imputation  . Although the intransitive characteristic of domination makes 
the job of finding a solution harder, it surely explains the cyclical behavior of many 
social organizations, where the solution changes according to the specific lobby that is 
enforcing their preferences at a given moment of time. 
Using the intransitive concept of domination, von Neumann and Morgenstern proved 
that the solution of a game corresponds to a set of imputations   that verify two distinct 
properties: firstly, no imputation contained in   can be dominated by another imputation 
contained in  ; and secondly, any imputation not contained in   must be dominated by 
at least one of the imputations in  . This result was probably one of the most important 
accomplishments of their work and it was essential to the subsequent evolution of game 
theory. 
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With respect to the theory of collusion, the concept of solution based on the principle of 
domination allowed us to solve many previously unsolved problems. In fact, given an 
industry composed by a limited number of profit-optimizing firms, we are now able to 
find what coalitions (or cartels) may be formed in the industry, the profits earned by 
each coalition and the strategies that must be played to obtain such profits (that is, the 
prices, quantities produced or any other control variable that firms must set). 
Notwithstanding, their concept of solution was still not enough to resolve other 
important issues, as one should expect from any newborn theory. We will illustrate 
some of those failures using examples of specific games. 
The simplest game presented in the von Neumann and Morgenstern’s book is the zero-
sum two-person game, which is composed by two players whose sum of payoffs is 
always equal to zero. Since in this game the gain of a player is the loss of the other, no 
coalitions can be formed and so this is not an interesting example from the standpoint of 
collusion theory. 
The second simplest game is the zero-sum three-person game. In this case three 
different coalitions can be formed (player 1 plus player 2, player 2 plus player 3 and 
player 3 plus player 1) and the solution of the game correspond to the three imputations 
of payoffs that result from the three possible alliances. Although in practice we only 
observe one coalition being formed, the other two coalitions are always present in an 
implicit way, as they affect the distribution of payoffs between the two allied players.   
Suppose, for instance, that in a particular zero-sum three-person game, the coalition 
formed by players 1 and 2 is able to get the payoff   (while player 3 earns   ), the 
coalition formed by players 1 and 3 is able to obtain   (while player 2 receives   ) and 
finally the coalition of players 2 and 3 is able to extract the payoff   from player 1. 
Suppose further that player 1 demands an amount   to anyone who desires to ally with 
him. If   is such that the sum of the payoffs that player 2 and player 3 are able to collect 
when each of them cooperates with player 1 is lower than the payoff player 2 and player 
3 can get when the two form a coalition, no one will be willing to cooperate with player 
1. In other words player 1 must demand an amount   such that             
    
      
 
 if he wants to join any coalition. Similarly, player 2 must demand an 
amount   
     
 
 and player 3 must demand an amount   
     
 
. This means that 
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each player will require to his potential ally the maximum amount he can possibly 
demand. He cannot ask for more due to the implicit threat of the other two players 
forming a coalition themselves. 
It follows that all players wish to belong to the only coalition of the game, but they 
don’t care to whom they colligate, since they always receive the same share of the 
payoffs as long as they belong to the alliance. Unfortunately this raises a remarkable 
problem: we have absolutely no way to determine what coalition is going to be formed, 
once every player is completely indifferent between cooperating with any of the other 
two players. 
This is one of the previously mentioned limitations of applying the principle of 
dominance to collusion theory. In many situations we cannot use the solution proposed 
by von Neumann and Morgenstern to determine which firms of the industry will form 
the cartel, for the simple reason that no particular coalition dominates the other.  
Another limitation of this concept of solution can be illustrated in a general non-zero-
sum two-person game. Remark that in this type of game a coalition is likely to occur, 
once the two players can joint their forces for mutual benefit. 
In the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior all general non-zero-sum n-person 
games are reduced to zero-sum games with     players and solved afterwards. This is 
done through the creation of an artificial player that has no interaction on the game but 
who earns the symmetric of the payoffs of the other players, so that the sum of the 
payoffs of the     players is null. In our case the non-zero-sum two-person game can 
thereby be transformed in a zero-sum game with three players. 
However, this game is different from the last example we gave. Because the third player 
is artificial the only possible coalition is between the two real players and there is no 
more an imminent threat of one of the players colligating with the third artificial player. 
Unfortunately, this also means that there is no way of determining how the two 
cooperating players will distribute the payoffs between them. As long as each of the 
players is better off when cooperating with the other, any distribution is possible. 
Once again, a major problem faced by a cartel is how to distribute the total profits 
among its members. And the principle of domination fails again to provide an answer, 
because no specific repartition of profits dominates the other. 
10 
 
It seems that the concept of dominance suggested by von Neumann and Morgenstern 
embraces too many solutions. Fortunately it didn’t take long until a more selective 
concept was created by the next mastermind in game theory, John Nash. 
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1.4. Applying the Nash equilibrium to cooperative collusion 
John Forbes Nash Jr. (born on 1928 in West Virginia) is one of the most important and 
worldwide famous mathematicians, whose contributions in game theory were essential 
to the development of various fields in economics, including collusion. Nash has been 
acknowledge for his genius mind, quick thinking, long lasting memory and specially for 
his impressive mathematical intuition, which allowed him to foresee the solution of the 
most complex problems that other brilliant mathematicians were not able to solve. In 
the words of the mathematician Donald Newman: 
“Everyone else would climb a peak by looking for a path somewhere on the 
mountain. Nash would climb another mountain altogether and from that distant 
peak would shine a searchlight back onto the first peak.” 
Nash has also been known for other peculiar characteristics of his personality. His 
arrogance and contempt for the established knowledge led him to attempt to discredit 
and correct Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity, even though he had never studied 
physics before. Due to his compulsive rationality he used to seek mathematical 
solutions for daily problems, as whether to take the elevator or to use the stairs. And his 
schizophrenic illness led to very strange events, as Nash sending letters to American 
embassies claiming that all men who wore red ties were conspiring to form a 
communist government.  
Between 1945 and 1948 Nash attained the Carnegie Institute of Technology, where he 
initially entered as a chemical engineering student, changing later to chemistry and once 
again to mathematics. At the end of the course he was not only awarded with the 
Bachelor degree, but also with a Master of Science, due to the high progress he had as a 
student. At the Carnegie Institute he also took a course in International Economics, 
which contributed to the ideas behind the paper we wrote on The Bargaining Problem, 
which in turn raised his interest in game theory. 
During this period Nash entered a few times the William Lowell Putnam Mathematical 
Competition, a renowned mathematical contest that rewarded the top 5 winners with a 
nominal prize and recognition. The contest involved solving twelve complex problems 
within a six hours time limit, whose difficulty was such that more than half of the 
competitors were not able to score a single point. Although Nash made it to the top 10 
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in his second attempt, he didn’t get to the top 5, a hard blow that he took pretty badly. 
However, this failure turned out crucial to the history of game theory. 
After taking his Master degree, Nash was accepted into the four most prestigious 
universities in mathematics: Harvard, Princeton, Chicago and Michigan. Nash had been 
attracted for long by the reputation and status of Harvard, which was initially his first 
choice. However the fellowship offered by Princeton was slightly better, in part because 
Harvard had always valued too much the results obtained in the Putnam competition, 
while the second university didn’t care about the test score. Thus, when Princeton 
finally offered him the most prestigious and important fellowship, the John S. Kennedy 
fellowship, Nash accepted it, as he considered that Harvard did not valued him enough. 
And it was precisely at Princeton – where von Neumann and Morgenstern were at that 
time – that John Nash produced his 27 pages PhD thesis containing the probably most 
important contribution of his life, the non-cooperative equilibrium or, as it would be 
denominated later, the Nash equilibrium. 
The concept of non-cooperative equilibrium reflects a stable situation in general n-
person games where players act rationally, independently and on behalf of their self 
interest only, without collaborating with each other. At the Nash equilibrium each 
player chooses the strategy that maximizes his payoff when the strategies of the other 
players are hold fixed or, in other words, at the Nash equilibrium there are no profitable 
deviations, since no agent can improve his gains as long as the other players keep their 
strategies constant. Nash (1951) proved the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium 
in any general n-person game by using a fixed point theorem, though it may not be 
unique. The non-cooperative equilibrium can be used to find the solution of a non-
cooperative game or, at least, its sub-solutions. 
There is a clear difference between the methods used by von Neumann and Nash to 
solve n-person games. While von Neumann considered a communicative and 
cooperative behavior between the players of a game, leading to the formation of groups 
or coalitions, Nash focused on the non communicative individual who acted only on 
behalf of his own self-interest. These two different perspectives seem a reflex of the 
contrasting personalities of the two mathematicians. Von Neumann was the kind of 
academic who enjoyed having meetings and discussions of science with his colleagues. 
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He exchanged papers and ideas with other researchers, who he often helped solving 
specific problems they couldn’t outrun. And his book on the theory of games was even 
written with the collaboration of a man of a different field, the economist Oskar 
Morgenstern. Nash, on the contrary, was the kind of man that liked to work alone, 
without joining any school of thought and without the orientation or collaboration of 
other researchers. Indeed he didn’t even read or study other authors, preferring to 
construct his theories from ground and to discover the knowledge by him, without 
“trusting” in other people.  
Curiously the concept of non-cooperative equilibrium turned out important to solve 
cooperative games as well. In his PhD dissertation, after presenting an application of the 
equilibrium to a three-man poker game, Nash claims that “a less obvious type of 
application is to the study of cooperative games (…) [where] players can and will 
collaborate as they do in the von Neumann and Morgenstern theory”. Indeed, 
cooperative games can simply be solved by reducing the process of negotiation to a 
non-cooperative model, as Nash (1953) illustrates in Two-person cooperative game, an 
article published a few years later.  
In this paper Nash presents a simple negotiation model between two distinct players. At 
the first stage of the model, each player establishes the strategy he will pursue if the two 
fail to reach an agreement (or, in other words, each player defines a threat that will be 
executed in case they fail to cooperate with each other). To guarantee the credibility of 
the threats players may sign a legal contract where they compromise to them. At the 
second stage of the game (the negotiation stage) each player demands a minimum level 
of payoff / utility for himself and, if the sum of their two “demands” can be attained 
within the rules of the game, they both get what they demanded. Otherwise they are 
forced to execute their threats. 
Solving this problem by backward induction, Nash finds that there are plenty equilibria 
at the second stage of the game, but only one of them is stable and relevant. Because the 
procedures used in the paper are complex, extensive and require mathematical and 
topological tools, we cannot expose here his original proof. But we can at least explain 
the main economic reasoning behind the negotiation process. Each player, in order to 
maximize the expected utility he will get at the end of the game, chooses the amount of 
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utility demanded taking into account that a greater demand increases the payoff 
obtained under cooperation, but it also decreases the probability of reaching an 
agreement. He faces, hence, a trade-off between the dimension and the consistency of 
his demand. At the solution, players choose the strategies that optimize the product of 
their net utility gain from cooperating. This idea was already present in The Bargaining 
Problem (Nash, 1950). 
Obviously the “demands” or utility levels negotiated crucially depend on the threats that 
players define at the first stage of the game. But once we have determined the solution 
at the second stage, we can solve the first stage as any other non-cooperative game: at 
the equilibrium, any player simply chooses the threat that optimizes his expected utility 
holding fix the strategy of the other player. 
Nash has thus provided us a strong model to investigate the distribution of the profits of 
a cartel. This distribution results from a bargaining process between firms, who demand 
the greatest possible share of total profits without jeopardizing their cooperative 
relation. If the firms are not able to legally compromise to a specific strategy, the threat 
executed when the agreement is not reached is simply the usual non-cooperative 
oligopoly solution. Therefore, a very important result is that the distribution of the 
profits of the cartel critically depends on the profits that firms would earn if they didn’t 
collude at all. 
The ideas behind the Two-Person Cooperative Game have shown that some 
components of a collusion game can only be solved using a non-cooperative 
equilibrium concept, such as the negotiation of the distribution of total profits, where  
the gain of one firm is the loss of the other. As a result, this paper allowed us for the 
first time to approach collusion, at least in part, as a non-cooperative behavior. 
Although this idea may seem counter-intuitive, remark that the firms of a cartel do not 
cooperate and coordinate their strategies on behalf of their common good, but on behalf 
of their self-interest only. And thus there are inevitably some stages of a collusion game 
where firms must act uncooperatively. 
Many other researchers have ever since applied the Nash equilibrium to solve 
cooperative games. Among them we are specifically interested in the work of Reinhard 
Selten, a German economist born on 1930 whose contributions to collusion theory 
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remain essential for current research and, in particular, for the analysis of partial 
collusion (cartels where only some firms of the industry collude). In his classic paper A 
Simple Model of Imperfect Competition where 4 are few and 6 are many, Selten (1973) 
investigates the decision process through which companies decide whether or not to 
participate in a cartel. This decision is another move in a collusive game where firms act 
only on behalf of their self-interest, disregarding any impact of their decisions on other 
firms. For that reason, as Nash did it in the analysis of the bargaining process, Selten 
studies the decision of entering a cartel by reducing the collusive game to a non-
cooperative form (where cooperative behaviors are modeled as moves in a non-
cooperative game). 
In his paper, Selten proposes a model composed by three different stages. Firstly, at the 
participation decision stage, firms simultaneously decide whether they want to enter the 
cartel bargaining. Then, the firms who decided to participate at the cartel bargaining 
stage communicate with each other and propose a quota system that defines the 
maximum levels of production. Only the firms who agree on an identical proposal are 
able to form a coalition and to sign an enforceable contract restraining their production 
levels. Finally, at the supply decision stage, firms produce and sell the output taking into 
account the maximum quotas they have previously defined. As always the model is 
solved by backward induction. However, because the third stage is a simple oligopoly 
game with production constrains and since the bargaining process has already been 
discussed, we will focus here on the solution of the first stage. 
In order to understand the economic reasoning underlying the participation decision, 
consider an industry composed by   equal firms and suppose that a fraction   of those 
firms form a cartel. A first important proposition is that, everything else equal, the firms 
outside the cartel have greater profits than the firms inside, since the outsiders are able 
to deviate from the cooperative strategy in order to increase their own payoffs. A second 
proposition is that the greater is the fraction  , the greater are the profits of the firms of 
the cartel, since a larger number of players are cooperating for mutual gain. Given these 
two propositions, a firm entering a cartel faces two different effects: on the one hand the 
firm may decrease its payoff, because it is now an insider instead of an outsider; on the 
other hand, the firm may increase its payoff, once the total number of cooperating firms 
has risen. 
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With this type of reasoning Selten proves that, in industries with a small number of 
firms, the best strategy for each company is always to participate in the cartel, because 
the second effect is much stronger. In opposition, when the size of the industry is very 
large, all firms gain with the creation of a cartel but, if possible, they prefer to remain 
outside of it. As a result the optimal behavior consists in carrying a mixed strategy, 
according to which a firm decides to participate with a certain probability and not to 
participate with another probability. 
Using linear demand and cost functions and a symmetry assumption, the author obtains 
an interesting numerical result: in industries with 4 or less firms, the whole industry 
always forms a cartel; in industries with 6 or more firms, it is very unlikely that any 
cartel will be created; in industries with 5 firms there is an intermediate situation where 
some firms join the cartel and others don’t. This clarifies why 4 are few and 6 are many.  
The results achieved by Nash and Selten through the application of the non-cooperative 
equilibrium to cooperative games were critical to the development of collusion theory. 
We are now not only able to determine how the total profits of a cartel are distributed 
between its members, but we can also establish in any industry which firms are going to 
collude and with what probability. Indeed, the many contributions of Nash and Selten to 
game theory earned them in 1994 the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science, 
shared also with John Harsany, another game theorist. 
Despite the use of the non-cooperative equilibrium to obtain new important results in 
collusion theory, it is important to remark that we are still modeling cartels as 
cooperative games in the sense that firms communicate and sign enforceable contracts. 
Therefore an important question arises: is it possible that firms collude without neither 
talking nor making any explicit agreements with each other? 
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1.5. The rise of non-cooperative collusion 
Due to the severe effects of collusion on social welfare, most advanced market 
economies have created competition authorities and antitrust laws that forbid any sort of 
agreements or combinations between firms to conspire against free competition. In 
United States the first antitrust law was the Sherman Act published in 1890, followed by 
the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act in 1914, as well as by many 
other state antitrust laws. In Europe the general rules on cartels are present in the Treaty 
of Rome signed in 1958 and in the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union in 
2009, although each country has its own competition authority and specific directives to 
regulate collusion.  
The fact that cartels became so tightly regulated with increasing sentences makes us 
wonder if firms are still able to successfully cooperate nowadays. Indeed, in the specific 
case of United States, collusion is a felony crime pursued by the Department of Justice 
and by the Competitive Bureau of Federal Trade Commission and it is punished not 
only with substantial fees, but also with prison sentences. Unfortunately, in the same 
way that not even life imprisonment or penalty death succeeds to prevent some hideous 
murders in several countries, there are always people willing to take chances and to 
attempt to make illegal cooperation agreements to increase their profits. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that cooperative collusive activities are increasingly 
harder to sustain, largely due to the new methods and tools used by competition 
authorities to detect them. One of the most important tools of the American Antitrust 
Division is the Leniency Program, initially implemented in 1978 and revised later in 
1993, according to which the first member confessing his participation in a cartel is 
given immunity from any criminal prosecutions, as long as he fully cooperates with the 
Division and fulfills other specified requirements. After the implementation of the 
Leniency Program the detection of cartelized industries became much more efficient, 
since firms were racing to be the firsts revealing the cartel, even before any 
investigation was started. According to Scott Hammond, the director of Criminal 
Enforcement of the Antitrust Division in 2000, “the United States' Corporate Leniency 
Program ("Amnesty Program") has been responsible for detecting and cracking more 
international cartels than all of our search warrants, secret audio or videotapes, and FBI 
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interrogations combined.” And its success was such that similar programs were applied 
in many other countries in the world. 
Given the active and effective methods of the competition authorities to detect 
violations of the antitrust law, one would expect that few collusive practices could 
survive today, especially in countries like United States. However, empirical evidence 
suggests that prices and quantities transacted are still too far away from the non-
cooperative levels in many oligopolistic industries. The only possible explanation is that 
firms found some way to, without communicating, make implicit or tacit agreements to 
keep prices high, restrain production levels and not to steal costumers from each other. 
This is the rise of non-cooperative collusion.  
If the hypothesis of non-cooperative collusion is to be sustained, there must be some 
equilibrium strategies for which firms are able to collude without meeting, talking and 
without making any type of enforceable agreements or side payments. Such strategies 
cannot exist, of course, in a one-period static game. In this case, if the firms of the 
industry attempt to collude, the best strategy for every firm is to deviate from collusion 
and to collect a greater payoff. And because the game lasts only one period, there is no 
mechanism available to punish the firms who deviate. Hence the analysis of non-
cooperative collusion only makes sense when the players interact repeatedly along time, 
so that any firm who deviates from the informal cartel can be punished by the others in 
the following periods. 
The idea that a non-cooperative cartel may arise in dynamic environments was 
discussed for the first time by George Stigler (1964) on A Theory of Oligopoly and it 
was developed later by James W. Friedman (1971), who proved the existence of a non-
cooperative “collusive” equilibrium in infinite supergames. By using the concept of a 
supergame (which consists in a sequence of ordinary static games played over time) 
Friedman introduced the role of dynamics in collusion theory and proved that when 
players are sufficiently patient regarding future payoffs (that is, when their discount 
factor is sufficiently large), a tacit cartel can be sustained in equilibrium.  
To illustrate this point, consider an industry where each firm plays the collusive strategy 
in every period, as long as all the other firms did the same in the past periods; 
howsoever, if at any moment of time a firm deviates from the collusive path, the whole 
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industry reverts to the competitive equilibrium forever. In this scenario any rational firm 
is willing to play the collusive strategy as long as the long run gains from colluding 
exceeds the “one shot” gain from deviating today. In other words, non-cooperative 
collusion can be played in equilibrium if the following incentive compatibility constrain 
(ICC) is verified: 
   
    
  
 
   
   
    
                                                  
where   
  is the profit received by firm   under collusion,   
  is the profit of the 
punishment phase (equal to the competitive profit),   
  is the profit earned by firm   
when it is the only one deviating from the collusive path and   is the discount factor. 
The left handed side of the ICC is the present value of all future gains of the cartel for 
firm   and the right handed side of the equation corresponds to the one shot gain from 
deviation. It can be shown that when the discount factor approaches the unit, the 
incentive compatibility constrain is always verified, proving that non-cooperative 
collusion is always possible if firms are patient enough about future payoffs.  
This kind of supergame strategies proposed by Friedman, which would be later known 
as trigger strategies (since any deviation from the collusive path “triggers” the 
competitive equilibrium forever), revolutionized completely the economic literature on 
collusion. The remarkable work of the author led economists to start investigating 
collusion as a “pure” non-cooperative game and to analyze new important issues. For 
example, there are currently countless papers identifying the industries where informal 
collusion is more likely and determining how it can be avoided. 
Some years later, Dilip Abreu (1984) proposed the substitution of trigger strategies by 
optimal penal codes in the analysis of infinitely repeated game with discounting. He 
argued that after a firm deviates from the collusive path, it would be much more 
efficient if all the other firms of the industry, instead of reverting to the competitive 
equilibrium, set their strategies to minimize the profits of the deviator. This way, by 
punishing in the hardest possible way any firm who deviates, the informal cartel 
becomes much easier to sustain because firms are afraid of being punished (this 
explains the term “optimal penal code”). In turn, if any of the firms deviates from the 
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punishment phase, a new punishment would be restarted, targeting this time the new 
deviator.  
Optimal penal codes are undoubtedly the most efficient strategy to sustain an informal 
cartel. And they turned out so important to the economic literature, that nowadays it is 
difficult to publish any article on informal collusion without at least mentioning them. 
Nevertheless, these strategies seem to move a little away from the notion of a non-
cooperative game, as it is very unlikely that firms are able to coordinate so complex 
strategies without communicating with each other. In fact, it is even a little naive to 
suppose that every firm of the industry will minimize the payoffs not only of the firms 
who deviate from the collusive path, but also of the firms who didn’t participate in the 
punishment phase, when they have never explicitly agreed to do so. For that reason we 
consider that trigger strategies are the apogee of the analyses of collusion as a non-
cooperative game. 
Finally we would like to make a last remark regarding informal cartels. We have shown 
that historical changes in the antitrust regulation considerably increased the importance 
of tacit collusion, which economists started modeling as a non-cooperative game. Yet 
informal cartels already existed even before collusive practices were forbidden by law. 
In a paper about non-cooperative collusion and imperfect information, Edward Green 
and Robert Porter give an example of the American rail freight industry as a cartel 
maintained in the 1880s (prior to the Sherman Act), whose firms played some kind of 
trigger strategy. However, because the demand of this industry was extremely volatile, 
the firms didn’t know if a drop in market prices were the result of a fall in demand or of 
some firms deviating from the collusive path. Although we are not interested in the 
specifics of the paper, the uncertainty faced by the firms of the cartel clearly shows that 
they did not communicate with each other and hence this was, in fact, a non-cooperative 
cartel. 
Informal cartels do not only exist for a long time, but they are also present in our reality 
more than we can imagine. Everywhere there are firms, sellers, employers, unions, 
countries and all the sort of economic agents making implicit agreements not to 
compete with each other, always at the cost of some third party left outside. And 
because these agreements are not written and not even discussed, most of the times it is 
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almost impossible to detect them. Thus it is extremely important to use the appropriate 
game theory tools to investigate this evil and persistent phenomenon present in market 
economies. 
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1.6. Conclusions  
Since the creation of a theory of games, new mathematical tools have been available to 
perform a more rigorous and formal analysis of collusion, contributing therefore to the 
increase of our scientific knowledge on the subject. 
When the new paradigm of game theory was initially created by John von Neumann and 
Oskar Morgenstern, it focused mainly on cooperative games where players form 
coalitions and the solutions were obtained using the principle of domination. At this 
point, game theory could be applied to industrial organization to determine the different 
possible combinations of cartels that could arise in any industry, the strategies played by 
each coalition and the payoffs obtained. Unfortunately the concept of domination 
embraces too many solutions and is not able to explain other important issues in the 
analysis of cartels. 
A few years later John Nash created a much more selective concept of solution for non-
cooperative games, the non-cooperative equilibrium, which turned out important to 
solve cooperative games as well. In fact, Nash illustrated how the bargaining or the 
negotiation process between rational agents can be reduced to a non-cooperative game 
and solved afterwards. Similarly, his reasoning can be used to determine how the profits 
of a cartel are distributed among its members, once the repartition of profits crucially 
depends on a negotiation process between firms. Reinhard Selten also succeeded in 
applying the Nash equilibrium to cooperative games in the analysis of the participation 
decision in cartels. Due to his work we are now able to predict the likelihood of the 
formation of a cartel in any industry, as well as the probability with which a particular 
firm will participate in it. 
The fact that the Nash equilibrium was so important to explain several aspects about 
collusion clearly shows that a cartel has many characteristics of a non-cooperative 
game, since its members always act only on behalf of their own self-interest. 
Notwithstanding, collusion only started being investigated as a “pure” non-cooperative 
game when the increasing importance of tacit or informal collusion led economists as 
James Friedman and Dilip Abreu to explain how firms can sustain a cartel without 
meeting and communicating with each other. And the work they developed on trigger 
strategies and optimal penal codes was essential to solve new important problems. 
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We have thus shown that along the course of history the analysis of collusion has 
changed from the use of cooperative games to the use of non-cooperative games and 
such evolution had an enormous impact on our scientific knowledge about cartels. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Theory of collusion in the labor market 
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2.1. Introduction 
The modern tools of game theory and industrial organization have been widely applied 
to several research areas, as labor economics in more recent years, contributing to our 
growing understanding of the most complex economic phenomena. Among the many 
mysteries still unsolved involving the particular characteristics and frictions in the labor 
markets is the evidence that, in certain industries, employers have enough market power 
to sustain low levels of employment and to pay to workers considerably below their 
marginal productivity. In this respect, Bhaskar, Manning & To (2002) have shown that 
oligopsonistic and monopsonistically competitive structures in labor markets are, 
indeed, the only explanation for many empirical facts, as the dispersion of wages among 
workers with similar skills and the positive impact of minimum wages on employment. 
And according to Manning (2003), “labour markets are ‘thin’ in the sense of there 
being few employment opportunities available at any moment in the immediate 
geographical locality of a worker”, largely due to search frictions and heterogeneity of 
jobs. In this chapter we sustain the hypothesis that collusive activities in the labor 
markets may be an additional important source and explanation for the low degree of 
competition observed. 
When we use the term collusion in the labor market we mean collusion in the demand 
side of the market, which may take the form of cooperative agreements between 
employers to reduce wages and employment levels, no-solicitation agreements and any 
other type of pacts to conspire against the worker and to distort free competition. In 
what follows, we briefly discuss three important empirical examples of those 
agreements. 
In 1997, an employee of Exxon Mobil Corporation, Roberta Todd, initiated a lawsuit 
alleging that the company was able to save over 20 million dollars in annual wages paid 
to managerial, professional and technical employees, due to cooperative interactions 
between the firm and fourteen other oil companies, as BP, Shell and Chevron. The 
collusive practices denounced included the conduct of surveys about past and current 
salary information and future salary budgets, exchanges of large amounts of detailed 
information between the firms and frequent meetings between the human resource 
departments to discuss current and future wage budgets. And even though the lower 
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court initially declined the claim, the court of appeals confirmed latter that this was, in 
fact, a violation of the antitrust laws. 
In 2006 the two registered nurses Pat Cason-Merenda and Jeffrey A. Suhre brought a 
lawsuit on behalf of all registered nurses employed between 2002 and 2006 in several 
hospitals and medical centers in the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area. Those 
hospitals were accused of conspiring to depress the wage levels of registered nurses in 
the context of a national nurse shortage, by exchanging detailed and non-public 
information about remunerations through meetings, telephone conversations and written 
surveys. In 2009 a settlement agreement was reached with St. John’s Health System, 
who has agreed to pay a compensation of over 13.5 million dollars.  
In September 24, 2010, the Department of Justice of the United States enforceable the 
high technology companies Google, Apple, Adobe, Intel, Intuit and Pixar to stop 
entering into no-solicitation agreements, in which they compromised not to steal 
workers from each other. Such contracts were responsible for restraining the wages of 
high skilled workers and for reducing access to better job opportunities and they 
constituted thereby an anti-competitive conduct. Unfortunately, no-solicitation 
agreements appear to have been restarted in 2011, when some high skilled employees 
claimed that the “cold calls” offering better payments and working conditions have 
ceased. This led the software engineer Siddharth Hariharan to fill a lawsuit against the 
previously mentioned companies plus Lucasfilm, in which he accuses the companies for 
conspiring against free competition and demands a compensation exceeding 25 
thousand dollars. 
Although these three cases alone provide strong evidence of the temptation of firms to 
reduce competition in the labor market, some other examples could be given. For 
instance, in 2012 it was not for the first time that the union of American football players 
sued the National Football League for fixing a secret salary cap, claiming damages of 
about one billion dollars. 
In fact there seems to be evidence of collusion in the labor market even in the middle 
age, as Peters (2010) discusses in a recent paper about the reactions of different labor 
markets to the Black Death in the fourteenth century. The author found that while in the 
Western Europe the fall in labor supply increased the wages, living conditions and 
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political rights of the peasantry, the opposite occurred in the Eastern Europe and in the 
Middle East, where landlords succeeded to collude and to force peasants to supply more 
unpaid work. The paper discusses further the economic reasons that enabled the two last 
geographic areas to sustain collusion. 
The damage of cartels on social welfare can be so severe that most advanced market 
economies have currently some form of legislation and authority to regulate collusive 
activities. In United States the first ever federal antitrust law, the Sherman Act, was 
created in 1890 and it stated in its first section that “every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal”. In the meantime other 
antitrust laws have been created, as the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton 
Act, both published in 1914, besides several state antitrust laws. All these acts constitute 
criminal laws prosecuted by the Department of Justice and by the Bureau of 
Competition of the Federal Trade Commission and their violation have been punished 
with growing fines and prison sentences. 
In Europe most countries have their own competition authorities, but general rules on 
competition have been provided by the Treaty of Rome since 1958 and by the Treaty on 
the functioning of the European Union after 2009, whose first paragraph of the article 
101 states that “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings (…) which have as their object or effect 
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market”. 
Nevertheless, when we actually analyze the cartels under the investigation of antitrust 
authorities, we observe that almost all are involved in collusive agreements to fix prices, 
limit production or divide markets, while the investigation of collusion in the labor 
market is extremely rare, perhaps because competition policy is traditionally more 
concerned with the welfare of the consumer than that of the worker. Yet this 
questionable priority should not justify a poor supervision of the illegal contracts to fix 
wages or employment levels, especially because collusion in the labor market can 
damage the consumer in a very similar way to collusion in the final good market, as we 
will show later. Another reason that may partially explain why it is so hard to detect 
collusive activities in the labor market is the difference in the behavior of consumers 
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and workers. While consumers who find themselves harmed by the cooperative actions 
of firms are always willing to report cartels to authorities, workers who find similar 
activities at their companies may prefer to remain silent in order not to risk losing their 
jobs or future career opportunities. But once again, the lack of investigation and the 
difficulty to detect collusion in the labor market should not mislead us to believe that 
those cooperative agreements seldom occur in reality. As Adam Smith said in 1776: 
“We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though 
frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that 
masters rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters 
are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform 
combination, not to raise the wages of labor above their actual price.” 
Unfortunately, the analysis of collusion in the labor market has not been a primary 
concern of the economic literature to date. In the words of Manning (2010) “we just 
don't know much about tacit collusion by employers because no-one has thought it 
worth-while to investigate in detail", although a few authors have addressed subjects 
somehow related. For example, Mukherjee, Selvaggi & Vasconcelos (2012) consider a 
principal-agent setting to study how exclusive employment contracts may increase the 
welfare of highly productive workers, by avoiding collusion between the principals; and 
Shelkova (2008) proposes that a non-binding minimum wage can be a focal point that 
coordinates tacit collusion between low-wages employers. These two articles not only 
fall on specific issues as exclusive employment contracts and non-binding minimum 
wages, but they also rely in particular scenarios as two-principals-two-agents contracts 
in the first case and a perfectly competitive product market in the second case. A more 
general model was presented by Bergès & Caprice (2008), who investigate how 
collusion in prices affects the wage and employment levels of qualified and unqualified 
workers. 
Other relevant and recent papers can be found in a wider literature about collusion in the 
input market. González & Ayala (2012) propose a two-retailers-one-producer model to 
prove that collusion between the retailers to reduce the wholesale price of the input 
improves the profitability and stability of collusive strategies to raise the retail prices. In 
other words, they show that collusion in the input market promotes collusion in the 
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downstream market, mainly because the two types of collusion make the punishment of 
deviating from the collusive path more severe. On the other hand, in a study by Christin 
(2009) it is presented another interesting result that the larger firms of an industry may 
sometimes collude to overbuy inputs, in order to exclude the smaller firms from the 
market. This strategy also reduces competition and harms consumers
2
.  
A major limitation of the extant economic literature is that most works address collusion 
in the final good market and collusion in the labor/input market separately, as if there 
was no connection between the two. In most economic models, firms are either assumed 
to cooperatively fix the price of the final good taking wages and other production costs 
as given, or to cooperatively determine the input price while the price of the final good 
is exogenously determined in a perfectly competitive market. Yet such assumptions 
may lead to spurious results. Indeed, when the American tobacco industry was 
convicted in 1946 for fixing the purchase prices of tobacco leafs (input) and the selling 
prices of cigarettes (final good), traditional oligopoly and oligopsony models were not 
able to explain how the companies of the cartel coordinated prices. On the contrary, 
Hamilton (1994) succeeded to fit the observed data using “a model of joint oligopsony-
oligopoly, which demonstrates that whatever market power the companies had in the 
cigarette and leaf market was unified.” It is hence the purpose of this chapter to study in 
detail the close relation between coordinating the price of the final good and the price of 
the input of production, which in our case is labor. 
In this chapter we actually show that collusion in the labor market and collusion in the 
final good market are completely equivalent and have the same impacts on social 
welfare, causing prices to raise and output, employment and wages to fall. The 
conclusion that one type of collusion implies the other does not only improve our 
understanding of coordinated strategies in oligopolies and oligopsonies, but it also 
means that collusion in one of the markets can be used as a mechanism to conceal 
collusion in the other market. For instance, firms may choose to fix wages in order to 
avoid explicitly fix prices and to reduce the risk of getting caught by antitrust 
authorities. In addition, we show that the higher prices and lower wages in cartelized 
industries are the outcome of the elimination of the well-known business stealing effect 
and of the labor force stealing effect, which are presented and explained in detail. To 
                                                   
2
 Further topics about collusion in the input market are discussed in Dowd (1996). 
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ensure that the results obtained are robust we do not consider specific functional forms 
and main assumptions are kept as general as possible (with the exception of the one-
input assumption, which is dropped in Chapter 3). 
In Section 2.2 we present the firm maximization problem and the competitive 
equilibrium in a very simple model with competition in quantities, where the connection 
between the product market and the labor market can be easily illustrated. In Section 2.3 
we present again the maximization problem and competitive equilibrium, but in a more 
robust model of price competition with differentiated products and differentiated job 
posts. In Section 2.4 we compute the collusive outcome, which is compared to the 
competitive equilibrium in order to derive the business stealing effect and the labor 
force effect. The impact of collusion on the main economic variables is then described 
in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6 we explain how collusion in the labor market may 
correspond to partial collusion in the product market and we analyze the effects of the 
collusive behavior on the firms outside the cartel, as well on other labor markets and 
industries. Section 2.7 discusses how the theory in this chapter can be applied to formal 
and informal cartels. Finally, Section 2.8 offers some concluding remarks. 
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2.2. A quantity competition model with homogenous products 
Consider an industry where there is a finite number of n firms selling a final good in an 
oligopolistic market and hiring workers in an oligopsonistic labor market. The firms 
face a final good demand function       , which gives an inverse relation between 
the market price and the total quantity demanded          , as well as a labor supply 
function
3
       , according to which the wage increases with the total amount of 
labor offered          . The total quantity of good transacted and the total labor 
force employed are respectively equal to the sum of the quantity produced and labor 
used per firm        and                 . 
Consider further that each firm has a different production function that uses labor as the 
only input,          . While such assumption may seem somehow unrealistic and 
restrictive, once production technologies frequently employ different types of labor, 
capital and natural resources, one can think of labor as a composite input that gathers all 
the usual productive factors. The only implication of this is that when we study 
collusion in the labor market we implicitly assume that firms are able to cooperatively 
determine the price of all the productive factors included in the composite input. 
Another plausible explanation for the one input production function is to read our work 
as a short-run analysis where capital is fixed and, as result, it doesn’t have any impact 
on optimal decisions about production and employment levels. Notwithstanding some 
may argue that the results could be significantly different when production functions 
have multiple inputs and firms can only successfully collude about the price paid to 
some (wages, for instance). We conduct such analysis in Chapter 3, where we show that 
the main qualitative results in this chapter remain valid, although the strategic 
interaction between firms is more complex and new effects and strategies occur. 
Therefore using production functions with one input allows us to prove some general 
results with simpler formal demonstrations, which may be particularly useful for those 
readers who do not wish to enter in more complex computations.  
As a final assumption, in order to guarantee that our problem has a unique interior 
solution, we impose convexity to the cost function    , which means that the labor 
                                                   
3
 In order to include unemployment in our model, one could consider instead a social labor supply 
function that accounts for the effects of labor unions and minimum wage policies. 
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supply function should not be excessively concave. The optimization problem of the 
firm is then to choose either the quantity produced (Cournot, 1838) or the amount of 
labor that maximizes the profit function           . Due to the one input 
assumption, the production function establishes an exact relation between the quantity 
of good and the quantity of labor and so profits can be expressed in terms of one of the 
variables only. Consider profits as a function of the quantity produced: 
        
 
   
         
      
 
   
   
                                     
Given that the market price is a decreasing function of the quantity produced and that 
the cost function is convex, the profit function is concave and first order conditions can 
be used to obtain the maximum: 
   
   
                            
              
        
          
      
  
  
    
   
   
 
  
  
   
   
                                          
This optimal condition states that the firm produces up to the point where the marginal 
revenue is equal to the marginal cost. Because firms must reduce the price to sell more, 
the marginal gain from producing an extra unit of product is equal to the price earned 
with that unit minus the price reduction undertaken multiplied by the quantity that the 
firm was already able to sell at a greater price (the so called loss in the infra-marginal 
units). With regards to the marginal cost, producing an extra unit implies using a greater 
amount of workers that the firm must attract with a wage increase. Thus the cost of 
producing an extra unit of the final good is the wage paid to the new workers hired plus 
the wage variation times the number of workers that the firm already had before. 
From equation (2.2.2) we obtain the best reply function   
       
   
     and the profit is 
given by       
    , once the firm can always choose to leave the market to avoid any 
losses. Finally, the optimal quantity produced by each firm is: 
  
               
     . 
Because the labor market has an oligopsony structure, every firm takes into account its 
power to partially control the wage level and so they choose to produce a lower quantity 
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and to hire fewer workers in order to prevent the wage from growing too much, as we 
can see from the second term of the right-hand side of equation (2.2.2). In contrast, if 
the labor market was perfectly competitive, this term would be equal to zero and the 
optimal quantity produced would be larger. 
The profit function could be rewritten as a function of labor only: 
            
 
   
             
 
   
                                        
This time the first order condition can be obtained by setting the derivative of the profit 
relative to the number of workers equal to zero. Note, however, that maximizing 
equation (2.2.1) with respect to quantities is equivalent to maximize equation (2.2.3) 
with respect to labor, since we only have expressed the profit function in terms of a 
different variable. 
   
   
               
            
                
           
     
   
   
 
  
  
   
   
     
  
  
                                           
We conclude that each firm is optimizing profits when the gain of hiring an extra 
worker equals its additional cost. Because the extra worker raises the production 
capacity of the firm, its marginal gain corresponds to the market value of the new units 
produced minus the necessary price reduction multiplied by the quantity that the firm 
was already able to sell with a smaller labor force. The marginal cost of labor is the 
wage that must be paid to the additional worker plus the product of the number of 
workers already hired times the necessary wage variation to attract an extra worker. 
From the first order condition in equation (2.2.4) we obtain the best reply function 
  
       
   
    . The profit is given by       
     and the optimal amount of labor is 
  
               
     . Once again, when deciding how many workers to hire in 
the labor market, the firm takes into account its power to influence the price of the final 
good. In fact, as long as the product market is not perfectly competitive, the second term 
of the left-hand side of equation (2.2.4) is not null and the firm measures the impact of 
hiring more workers in the production level and, thereby, in the final price. 
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The optimal conditions previously obtained can be used to get the final good supply and 
the labor demand functions. Solving equation (2.2.2) in order to the price gives the 
inverse supply function of the firm,         . The market final good supply is equal 
to the sum of the quantities produced by all firms together:      
     . In turn, 
solving equation (2.2.4) in order to the wage gives the inverse labor demand of the firm, 
        , and the market labor demand is equal to the sum of the labor demanded by 
all firms:       
     . 
The non-cooperative equilibrium of the model corresponds to the market price, wage, 
individual quantities produced and number of workers hired by firm for which the 
product market and the labor market are in equilibrium. Solving the system of   best 
reply functions expressed in quantities gives the quantity produced by firm. Replacing 
these quantities in the production functions or solving the system of   best reply 
functions in terms of labor gives the number of workers hired by firm. Finally the 
market price and wage can be directly obtained from the final good demand and labor 
supply functions. 
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2.3. A price competition model with product differentiation 
Although the previous quantity competition model was useful to provide some initial 
intuition about the relation between the labor market and the final good market, we 
believe that price competition usually represents a better approximation from reality, as 
in most industries firms are free to set the optimal prices to compete with their rivals. If 
the products sold and the jobs offered were homogeneous, we could use a Bertrand 
(1883) model to describe the interactions in the product and labor markets. But again, 
empiric evidence strongly suggests that most products are not completely identical and 
consumers are willing to pay higher prices for the goods that have the characteristics 
they most value. Similarly, jobs in the industry are usually seen by workers as 
heterogeneous, due to different working conditions, benefits, company values or even 
distance from home.  
For these two reasons consider now price competition in the final good market with 
product differentiation and wage competition in the labor market with job 
differentiation. It is not important whether the product or job differentiation arises from 
an endogenous mechanism as it is described in the Hotelling model (1929) or in the 
circle model by Salop (1979). All it matters is that each firm faces an individual demand 
function that is decreasing with respect to its own price and increasing with respect to 
other firms’ prices,              , and an individual labor supply that increases with 
the own wage and decreases with other firms’ wages,              . Naturally, 
market demand               is decreasing with respect to any price and total labor 
supply               is increasing with respect to any wage. Once again, each firm 
faces a production function that uses labor as the only input,          , and the cost 
function given by              is convex (that is, the labor supply function cannot be 
too concave). 
At the non-cooperative equilibrium each firm chooses the price and the wage that 
maximize profits, taking the decisions of the other firms as given. Despite the absence 
of a direct relation between the price and the wage, the profit function             
can still be written as a function of only one of these two variables. Consider first the 
profit function in terms of prices: 
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Since the profit function is concave, its maximum is attained at the point where the 
derivative of profits in order to the price is equal to zero: 
   
   
       
         
      
   
   
      
      
   
  
        
       
      
   
     
      
      
   
     
         
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
                                    
According to equation (2.3.1), when the firm is maximizing its profit a small change in 
the price does not have any effect on profits. Indeed, if the derivative was positive it 
would be profitable to slightly increase the price, while if it was negative the opposite 
would be true. The first two terms of the left-hand side of equation (2.3.1) are the 
impact of a price variation in the revenue obtained in the goods market: when the price 
increases, the firm gains one more unit of money for each unit of product transacted and 
loses the market value of all the products that are no longer sold due to the price rise. 
The two last terms of the left-hand side of equation (2.3.1) are the effect of a price 
variation in the total costs incurred from hiring workers in the labor market. On the one 
hand, when the price is increased, less workers are required to satisfy the falling 
demand, allowing the firm to save on the wages paid to those workers. On the other 
hand, once the firm hires fewer workers, it is now able to hold all the necessary labor 
force at a lower wage level. 
The best response function that comes from equation (2.3.1),   
            , defines 
the optimal price for firm   as a function of a vector of prices and wages from the other 
firms and the profit obtained is equal to       
      . Analogously to the last section, 
when the firm sets the optimal price in the product market it takes into account its 
power to constraint the wage paid to the workers. Therefore, the firm sets a higher price 
than it would if the labor market was perfectly competitive, case in which the fourth 
term in the left-hand side of equation (2.3.1) would be null. 
Now consider the profit function expressed in terms of wages: 
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The corresponding first order condition is the following:   
   
   
         
       
    
      
   
 
   
     
   
  
     
      
   
            
      
   
      
     
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
                                 
The two first terms of equation (2.3.2) describe the revenue gain obtained in the final 
good market when the firm raises the wage level in one unit: on the one hand, a greater 
wage attracts more workers that are able to produce more and the firm earns the market 
value of the extra production; on the other hand, to sell the additional production the 
firm must reduce the price, which decreases the revenue of all the units of the good that 
were already sold before. The two last terms of equation (2.3.2) correspond to the 
additional cost incurred in the labor market: when the wage increases in one unit, not 
only the firm has to pay an extra unit of money for every worker in the company, but it 
also attracts more employees to whom must be paid the whole wage. 
From equation (2.3.2) we get the best response function that expresses firm  ’s optimal 
wage as a function of the wages and prices set by its rivals,   
            . As usual, 
every firm is free to leave the market to avoid losses and profits are thus given by 
      
      . Finally note that a firm setting the wage in the labor market is aware of 
its ability to influence the price in the product market, as we can see from the second 
term of the left-hand side of equation (2.3.2) (this term is different than zero as long as 
the product market is not perfectly competitive). 
The competitive equilibrium of this model consists in four vectors of   variables, the 
prices, quantities, number of workers and wages, for which every firm in the market 
optimizes profits given the decisions undertaken by its rivals.  
The    equilibrium variables of the model can be obtained with    equations:   goods 
demand functions,   labor supply functions and   production functions that are 
exogenous to the model, as well as   best reply functions obtained from profit 
maximization. Although we derived   best reply functions in terms of prices and   best 
reply functions in terms of wages, the firsts are equivalent to the seconds, as they are 
closely related through the exogenous functions of the model. 
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2.4. Collusive outcome 
So far we have studied how firms that produce a final good using labor as their only 
input make optimal decisions in a competitive scenario. In this section it is shown how 
the strategic interaction and main results change when firms build a cartel that optimizes 
joint profits. The results obtained here are crucial to understand the role of competition 
authority in the regulation of the labor market.  
When firms compete in quantities and products are homogeneous, the collusive 
outcome corresponds to all firms producing together the monopoly quantity and setting 
the market price and wage that allows them to produce such quantity. If firms have 
equal and constant marginal costs, it doesn’t matter how the cartel’s total output is 
distributed between them. If instead firms have different linear cost technologies, only 
the most efficient ones should produce (unless the presence of capacity constrains 
requires less efficient firms to produce a part of the monopoly quantity). And if firms 
have different non linear cost technologies, the total production should be distributed 
between them in such a way that the marginal cost of producing an extra unit is equal 
for every firm. Despite the greater simplicity of working with competition in quantities, 
from now on we will only consider price and wage competition with differentiated 
products and job posts, which certainly characterizes better the majority of the 
industries. 
For that reason suppose now that each firm produces a specific differentiated good that 
can only be achieved using the firm’s production technology. Consider also that the 
degree of efficiency in the use of labor and the attractiveness of working conditions 
vary from firm to firm. In these circumstances it is no longer possible to define a global 
market price and wage that maximize aggregate profits. Instead, the cartel must define a 
specific price and wage per firm that takes into account how the product is valued by 
consumers, the efficiency of the cost technology and the attractiveness of the job. 
Therefore the vector of prices and wages that maximize the profits of the cartel are the 
solution to the following maximization problem:  
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Although it is not possible to eliminate all the restrictions and to express profits as a 
function of either wages or prices, the optimization problem faced by the cartel can still 
be simplified to have one set of restrictions only: 
                                                 
 
   
 
           
  
                         
 
  
                         
     
This particular specification of the problem allows us to withdraw some previous 
conclusions. Despite having    instruments available to optimize profits (  prices plus 
  wages), the cartel is constrained by   different restrictions. This means that actually 
the cartel has only   instruments to optimize profits, while the other   instruments are 
directly obtained from the firsts. Because the profit function is concave and the solution 
is unique, the cartel may choose prices and wages directly result from labor supplies, 
production functions and final good demands; or the cartel may set the optimal wages 
and prices are obtained from the demand functions, given the production levels of all 
the workers of the industry. 
In other words, collusion in the goods market and collusion in labor market are 
completely equivalent when the firms that compete in the two markets are the same. 
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2.4.1. Business stealing effect 
The optimization problem previously described can be solved using the Lagrange 
multipliers method, which consists in maximizing the following objective function: 
                                              
               
 
   
  
The Lagrangian multipliers    can be interpreted as the shadow price of labor, in other 
words, as the value that one worker operating in firm   has to the total profits of the 
cartel. 
At the optimal interior solution the derivatives of the Lagrangian function with respect 
to the decision variables                           are equal to zero. Thus, the 
first order conditions with respect to prices are: 
  
   
                 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                                   
From equation (2.4.1) it follows that when a firm increases the price in one unit, it not 
only earns one extra unit of money for each product sold and loses the mark-up (price 
minus marginal cost of production) of the final products that are not sold anymore 
         , but it also accounts for the positive impact of fixing a higher price on the 
demand of the remaining firms          , who get an additional revenue. Howsoever 
this last impact of increasing the price was not considered in the non-cooperative 
setting, as one can easily observe in the optimal condition in equation (2.3.1) rewritten 
in terms of the mark-up:  
             
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
                                         
This means that relatively to the non-cooperative scenario each firm has an extra 
incentive to raise the price, as it is aware of the positive effect it has on the production 
levels of the other companies. Actually, one of the reasons why prices tend to be lower 
in competitive markets is the existence of a business stealing effect. When firms are free 
to compete with each other they tend to reduce prices as an attempt to steal valuable 
market shares from their rivals. Because the cartel eliminates this business stealing 
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effect, companies refrain from lowering prices, as that would injure the total 
profitability of the cartel. 
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2.4.2. Labor force stealing effect 
A deeper analysis of equation (2.4.1) allows us to observe another effect that contributes 
to the rising prices of the cartel. As we can see in that equation, the net gain of selling 
an extra unit of good is the price minus the marginal cost of production, which 
corresponds to the additional amount of labor used multiplied by the value that each 
worker has to the cartel given its best alternative use (  . To comprehend what is indeed 
the value or shadow price of labor, we must take a look to optimal conditions with 
respect to wages:  
  
   
         
   
   
 
   
     
   
   
  
 
   
                                   
According to equation (2.4.3) the wage of any firm must be set at the level where the 
marginal gain – the increase in the entire labor force times the value that each worker 
has to the cartel – is equal to the marginal cost – the extra unit of money that must be 
paid per worker plus the wages that must be paid to the new workers hired. It is 
important to remark that, once again, the wage paid by firm   is determined taking into 
account not only the effect it has on the workers hired by that firm, but also on the 
cartel’s entire labor force. To find an expression for the shadow price of the workers 
operating in firm   we solve equation (2.4.3) for   : 
  
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
   
  
   
   
     
            
   
   
         
   
   
   
   
   
   
                               
From equation (2.4.4) we conclude that if the cartel is maximizing joint profits, the 
value of the last worker employed by firm        must be equal to the cost of hiring him. 
But while in the competitive setting the cost of hiring an extra worker is, as we can see 
in equation (2.4.2), the wage paid to him plus the necessary wage variation to increase 
the labor force of the firm times the labor force employed                , in the 
collusive setting the cost of an additional worker corresponds to that same expression 
plus the cost of stealing labor from the remaining firms, who lose the difference 
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between their shadow price and wages (third term in the right-hand side of equation 
(2.4.4)).  
To understand this crucial difference note that when firms are competing they only care 
about their own labor force and so hiring an additional worker may imply stealing 
workers from other firms of the industry. Indeed, in the non-cooperative equilibrium 
there is a “labor force stealing effect” that motivates all firms to increase wages in order 
to attract workers employed in rival companies, causing employment and production 
levels to rise and prices to fall. Because the cartel eliminates the labor force stealing 
effect, companies become more reluctant in declining prices as they know that their 
marginal cost of production is now greater, once it includes the cost of stealing workers 
from other firms: 
                   
   
   
         
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
  
       
   
   
 
   
   
                
Although we have proved that prices are higher under collusion due to the elimination 
of the labor force stealing effect, our definition of the shadow price of labor in equation 
(2.4.4) is still difficult to understand, as it is expressed in terms of the shadow price of 
the workers of the other firms. In order to find a more intuitive economic interpretation 
for the shadow price, we will assume for now that the cartel is symmetric, that is, all the 
firms have the same cost technology and face symmetric goods demand and labor 
supply functions. In this case, the price, wage and shadow price is equal for every firm 
and equation (2.4.3) can be simplified as follows: 
   
   
   
 
   
       
   
   
 
   
           
  
 
   
   
 
   
           
  
  
   
     
           
   
  
                                                       
We conclude that in a cartel composed by symmetric firms, the cost of hiring an extra 
worker is the wage paid to him      plus the necessary wage variation to increase the 
labor force of the cartel in one unit          (instead of the wage variation required to 
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increase the labor force of the firm in one unit,        ) times the number of workers 
employed at firm       . Indeed, when firms are engaged in a symmetric cartel a worker 
stolen from other firms has absolutely no additional value, since the total labor force of 
the cartel remains constant and the value of the worker is the same regardless of the 
company he is employed in (due to the symmetry assumption). Hence the shadow price 
   refers to the value of hiring an additional worker that was not operating in the 
industry yet. And the cost of such worker includes the necessary wage variation to 
increase the total labor force in one unit         . 
Now that we are aware of what the shadow price of labor is when the cartel is 
optimizing profits, we can apply the symmetry assumption to equation (2.4.1) and 
replace    by equation (2.4.5): 
          
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
                
   
   
  
   
   
 
   
      
                
   
  
 
   
   
 
  
   
                                        
Given that        is greater than        , we once again conclude that the marginal 
cost of production is larger in the collusive scenario, which encourages the firms of the 
cartel to raise prices. It is important to remark at this point, however, that such 
conclusion does not depend on the assumption of symmetry, which was only imposed 
for exposition purposes. Finally, to prove that it takes a greater wage variation to raise 
the entire labor force of the cartel in one unit          than to raise the labor force of 
the firm in one unit           is straightforward, given that the labor supplied to any 
firm decreases with the wages set by its rivals and given that the total labor supply is 
equal to the sum of the labor supplies of all firms: 
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2.5. Impact of collusion on the main economic variables 
In the previous sections we compared the optimal condition for the price of a particular 
firm   under free competition with the optimal condition under collusion. We asserted 
that, holding fix the prices of the rest of the industry, the price charged by firm   is set at 
a higher level in the collusive setting in order to eliminate the business and labor force 
stealing effects. However, we must now take into account that, under collusion, the 
prices of the remaining firms of the industry are increased as well and, as a result, the 
optimal price charged by firm   is even higher than it would be if the prices of the other 
firms remained constant
4
. This clearly shows that the formation of a cartel raises the 
prices of every single firm in the industry. 
Similarly, if we hold fix the wages of the other firms, the higher price set by firm   
under collusion directly determines that the wage paid must be lower, due to the strong 
connection between the labor market and the final good market. But, once again, 
because the other firms in the cartel are also pressured to decrease the wage, the optimal 
wage paid by firm   is fixed at an even lower value in the collusive scenario. An 
alternative way to prove that collusion reduces the wage levels of the whole industry is 
to repeat the procedures in the previous sections for the optimal conditions with respect 
to wages. 
Once it was determined that the formation of a cartel augments all prices and reduces all 
wages of the industry, it follows directly from the market demand function and total 
labor supply function that the total quantity transacted and the total employment level 
must fall. In turn, this sustains that collusion in the labor market and collusion in the 
final good market have always a negative impact on the consumer and worker’s 
welfare. 
It should be highlighted, though, that when a cartel is composed of firms which are 
sufficiently asymmetric, optimal behavior may require some of them to augment the 
production level and to hire more workers. In fact, suppose that in a cartelized industry 
there is one firm much more efficient than the others and which produces a good 
preferred by most consumers. In such case the cartel will artificially increase 
                                                   
4
 It follows from equations 7 and 8 that the optimal price of one firm is a positive function of the other 
prices. 
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considerably less the price of that firm than the price of the others and, consequently, it 
may be the case that the efficient firm is required to produce more and to hire more 
workers. Nevertheless, this would be an exceptional case and, on average, firms would 
still decrease the production level and employ fewer workers. 
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2.6. Partial collusion 
The previous analysis of collusion focused on industries where the firms in the supply 
side of the product market coincide with the firms in the demand side of the labor 
market. But in reality this perfect match is not common, either because different firms 
of the same industry have access to different labor markets (case in which collusion in 
the labor market causes partial collusion in the product market) or because the same 
labor market supplies workers to different industries (case in which collusion in the 
product market leads to partial collusion in the labor market). This section covers the 
former case. 
Consider an industry where     firms produce and sell a differentiated product in the 
final product market, competing with each other in prices. As usual, each firm faces an 
individual good demand function that decreases with its price and increases with the 
price of the rivals,              , as well as a production function that uses one type 
of labor as the only input,          . Suppose further that the industry can be 
decomposed in two sets of firms that set wages and hire workers at two distinct labor 
markets,   firms at labor market   and the remaining   firms at labor market  . The 
reason why different firms have access to different labor markets may either be their 
concentrated location at different industrial zones or because their production functions 
require different types of specialized workers. The labor supplied to each firm is 
increasing with respect to the own wage and decreasing with respect to the wages of the 
rivals located at the same labor market,   
       
     
   and    
       
     
  . 
It is now our concern to study the economic effects of collusion in one of the labor 
markets. Suppose that the   firms located at labor market   decide to set wages 
cooperatively, which as we already know directly determines their price levels. When 
colluding, the optimizing behavior of the   firms is characterized by equation (2.6.1): 
  
     
     
    
    
 
   
 
   
 
   
  
   
   
                                        
As always the   firms of the cartel refrain from stealing business and labor force from 
each other and the result is that they all fix greater prices and smaller wages. 
Notwithstanding the industry is not composed only by the   firms involved in the cartel, 
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but also by other   firms competing in the final product market who are going to react 
to the rising prices. Because the later firms are not colluding, their non-cooperative 
optimizing behavior is characterized by equation (2.3.1):  
  
     
     
    
    
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
       
     
     
    
 
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
  
 
   
    
  
      
     
 
  
  
 
   
    
  
     
     
  
            
 
   
  
  
 
   
    
  
                                            
Equation (2.6.2) is the best reply function for any of the   firms at labor market  , 
which depends on the prices of the firms of the cartel through the quantity produced   
 . 
Using equation (2.6.2) it is possible to prove that under convex cost functions and 
concave and additive demand functions, the best reply to the non-cooperative firms is to 
produce more at a higher price (see proof in Appendix A). 
Intuitively, when the prices of the firms belonging to the cartel go up, the other firms in 
the industry face a greater demand and sell more, which encourages them to increase 
prices for two reasons: in the first place, producing more implies a greater marginal cost 
that must be offset by a greater price; secondly, the marginal gain of increasing the price 
is now multiplied by a larger number of units of the final good.  
In addition, since all the   non-cooperative firms face now a greater demand, they have 
to increase the wages in order to attract more workers at the labor market B, in order to 
meet the new production levels. Note that the wage defined by each firm is indeed an 
increasing function of the quantity produced,  
    
     
     
      
  . 
In conclusion, the effects of the creation of a cartel in labor market   go far beyond the 
fall in wages and employment at that market. The most important effect is probably the 
increase in prices not only of the cooperative firms, but also of the whole industry. 
Now, once total demand falls with prices, the total quantity transacted is reduced to the 
detriment of consumer welfare. In addition, and perhaps more interestingly, collusion in 
labor market   has a positive externality effect on wages and employment in labor 
market  , once these two markets are connected by the same industry. Indeed when the 
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firms at labor market   collude, some of their production level is transferred to the other 
firms of the industry, who must hire more workers at greater wages. 
The analysis in this section could be prosecuted by considering that labor market   also 
supplies workers to other industries, who would be able to attract fewer workers and 
who would be forced to produce less at higher prices. Thus the general conclusion is 
that collusion in a specific labor market may have negative effects on prices and 
quantities on several industries but, simultaneously, positive effects on wages and 
employment on other labor markets. 
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2.7. Some notes on the cooperative nature of collusion 
In the previous sections we have studied the effects of the creation of a cartel that 
maximizes joint profits by fixing the optimal wages in the labor market or, equivalently, 
by setting the optimal prices in the final product market. In this section we wonder if the 
assumption of joint profit maximization is reasonable, which may depend on whether 
the game played is cooperative or non-cooperative. 
Suppose firstly that firms play a cooperative game, by which we mean that they are able 
to communicate with each other, negotiate enforceable agreements and make side 
payments. In this case, if joint profits are not being optimized, firms can always 
negotiate a better deal and use side payments to guarantee that everyone gains. And 
because the new contract is enforceable, they are willing to do such deal until joint 
profits are at its maximum. Although cooperative behavior is harder when formal cartels 
are illegal, it is always possible to communicate and to make side payments “off the 
record”, while credible threats can be used to enforce the negotiated agreements. 
Therefore, it is extremely important to regulate and to investigate whether there is 
collusion in the labor market, in order to avoid cooperative behaviors that lead to the 
maximization of joint profits along with the negative consequences on social welfare. 
Unfortunately, even if the competition authority is able to compel firms not to cooperate 
explicitly, an informal cartel can still be sustained using, for example, the trigger 
strategies in Friedman (1971) or the optimal penal codes in Abreu (1984). In the 
particular case of trigger strategies it can be shown that, as long as every firm is strictly 
better off when colluding, there are discount rates lower than one for which collusion 
can be sustained in equilibrium at every stage of an infinite super game (see Appendix 
B). However, because the game is now non-cooperative and side payments are not 
possible anymore, at least some symmetry is required to guarantee that joint profit 
maximization improves the profits of all firms. Hence the theory presented in this 
chapter can also be applied to non-cooperative games when the firms of the informal 
cartel are not too heterogeneous. Finally it is important to recall that joint profit 
maximization is not the only non-cooperative equilibrium, as it is proved by the Folk 
theorem. 
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2.8. Conclusions 
We have formulated a general theoretical framework to investigate collusion in the 
labor market and we believe that the results obtained are not only relevant for economic 
policy purposes, but they are also surprising and unexpected in some degree, 
contributing to a better understanding of some interactions observed in the labor 
markets.  
The first temptation for anyone who addresses this subject for the first time is probably 
to imagine that any agreement between employers to decrease wages reduces the 
marginal cost of production and, as a result, encourages firms to sell more at lower 
prices, making consumers better off. Yet this reasoning would only make sense if the 
fall in wages was caused, not by the cooperative action of firms, but by an exogenous 
shock in the external environment of the industry. For instance, if a mass immigration 
of highly-skilled workers reduced the wage level, firms would indeed be able to hire 
more workers at a lower cost and so they could produce more and charge a lower price 
for the final good. This is not the case, however, when the fall in wages is caused by an 
endogenous mechanism as collusive agreements. As we have established in this chapter, 
in the absence of external exogenous shocks, firms can only successfully push wages 
down if they constrain the amount of labor hired, which forces them to produce less and 
to increase prices. And thus collusion in the labor market is shown to harm both 
consumers and workers, suggesting that competition authorities should use their 
resources to detect and prevent such practices. 
Furthermore we have measured the sources responsible for the different levels of 
economic variables in the non-cooperative and collusive equilibria. Because in the non-
cooperative scenario firms only care about their own profits, they do not internalize the 
cost of stealing consumers and workers from rival companies and so firms raise the 
wage and reduce the price in a greater extent than they would under collusion. By 
eliminating the business and labor force stealing effects, the cartel imposes higher prices 
and lower levels of wages, employment and production, improving thereby the joint 
profits of the industry. 
Under the one input assumption we show further that collusion in the labor market is 
equivalent to collusion in the final goods market, since both have the same impact on 
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profits and social welfare. But given that competition authorities punish severely any 
collusive activities in the final goods market while they rarely investigate similar 
practices in the labor market, there is a clear and strong incentive for firms to jointly fix 
wages instead of prices, as a mean to conceal their cooperative behavior. This way, 
firms who collude in the labor market are able to sustain high price levels while, at the 
same time, they prevent competition authorities from collecting evidence of cooperative 
price setting (usually in the form of witnesses, signed documents, confessions and legal 
recordings of meetings and phone conversations). It is therefore imperative that 
competition authorities look for evidence of agreements to cooperatively set wages and 
employment levels as well.  
Most results in this chapter could be directly extended to the analysis of collusive 
agreements to fix the prices of any other inputs, as raw materials, machinery or 
equipments used in the productive process. The reason why we focus on collusion in the 
labor market is that it appears to be empirically more relevant and to have greater 
implications on social welfare. In fact, while firms usually have the ability to affect the 
wages of labor, most of times they have less market power than their suppliers and 
cannot fix as easily the prices of other inputs (for instance, when buying raw materials, 
firms usually face an exogenous price depending on the total amount they are willing to 
buy). Still, our conclusions may be useful to comprehend the effects of collusion 
between big retailers with substantial market power, as supermarket stores. 
In Chapter 3 we introduce new features in our model that are more specific to labor 
markets, making the analysis more realistic, but considerably more complex. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
Theory of semi-collusion in the labor 
market 
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3.1. Introduction 
There is nowadays little disagreement about the role of free competition in the 
efficiency of the markets and social welfare. In the current free market system, a high 
degree of competition not only guarantees the supply of a great number and variety of 
goods at low prices, but also the dispersion of economic power among all individuals of 
society. Indeed, in very competitive markets each individual is able to earn a salary 
according to his skills and productivity, as well as a “fair” rent for the capital he was 
able to save along his life. Unfortunately, the ideal concept of perfect competition so 
often discussed in economic theory is not always present in real industries. Sometimes, 
when countries are not sufficiently opened to international trade and transport costs are 
high, markets are simply not large enough to promote competition. Other times, due to 
large economies of scale or network effects some goods can only be efficiently 
produced by one firm. That is the case of the natural monopoly. But perhaps most often, 
the free market system is jeopardized by the cooperative action of some individuals who 
conspire against society to reduce the level of competition and to get a monopoly rent.  
Almost all cartels uncovered so far have been charged of fixing prices or undertaking 
any other form of collusive deals in the final good market, while cartels who fix wages 
are hardly ever investigated, probably due to the enormous concern of competition 
authorities with the welfare of the consumer relatively to the welfare of the worker. We 
believe, however, that competition authorities should also be responsible for the 
prosecution of cartels in labor markets, for at least two important reasons. Firstly, in the 
absence of any other regulatory authority in charge of preserving competition between 
employers, the protection of the welfare of the worker is an important mean to achieve 
justice and efficiency, particularly in modern economies where the large part of the 
population works for somebody else.
5
 Secondly, as we have already seen, collusion in 
the labor market leads to collusion in the final good market and so it has severe impacts 
on consumer’s welfare as well. 
In Chapter 2 it was established that cooperative agreements between firms cause wages, 
employment levels and quantities transacted to fall and prices of the final good to rise. 
                                                   
5
 Indeed, in United States nine out of ten working individuals are paid employees, whereas only one is 
self employed (see Hipple, 2010). 
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Yet those results were obtained under the assumption that firms are able to 
cooperatively determine the price of all inputs. In opposition, in this chapter we 
consider a semi-collusive model where firms are only able to undertake cooperative 
agreements about the price of some inputs used in their production functions. 
The economic concept of “semi-collusion” is not new in economic literature and 
appears to have been used for the first time by Fershtman and Muller (1986), who 
defined semi-collusive markets as those “where rivals compete in one variable (or set of 
variables) and collude in another”. Nonetheless there are some earlier contributions 
which, despite not using explicitly the term “semi-collusion”, end up discussing the 
same subject.  
According to Steen and Sørgard (2009), typical models of semi-collusion are composed 
of a two-stage game, where in the first stage firms set the non-price variables (which are 
usually more rigid) and in the second stage they choose prices. Then there are two 
groups of models, those where firms collude on prices and compete on non-price 
variables and those where the opposite occurs.  
In the first group of models, collusion on prices typically leads to tougher competition 
in the non-price variables and injures both consumers and firms. Some of the earlier 
examples include Bloch (1932) and Lorange (1973), who respectively describe a 
German coal industry cartel in the 20s and a cartel of Norwegian cement producers in 
the 60s, whose members cooperatively fixed prices and total production levels, but 
competed on productive capacity. Because the market share of every producer was 
defined as a function of their productive capacity, collusion led to an inefficient over-
investment by all firms. The members of price cartels may also compete in other 
variables, as advertising (Eckard, 1991) and research and development (Brod and 
Shivakumar, 1999).  
In the second group of models, where firms compete on prices and collude on other 
variables, semi-collusion always improves profits, but may benefit or hurt consumers 
depending on the particular characteristics of the game. Some examples include semi-
collusion on non-price variables as quality (Deltas and Serfes, 2002), advertising 
(Simbanegavi, 2009) and research and development (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 
1988). However, in the words of Steen and Sørgard (2009): 
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“(…) except for collusion on R&D there are few examples in the literature on 
collusion on non-price variables. As far as we know, there are only a few studies 
of collusion on advertising and a study of investment in infrastructure in 
telecom.” 
Our work belongs to this second group of models and studies collusion on wages 
(which can also be seen as collusion on the productive capacity), contributing to cover 
what, to our knowledge, constitutes a gap in the extant literature. 
To understand the empirical relevance of the semi-collusion hypothesis, recall two 
examples of cooperative agreements in the labor market that we discussed in Chapter 2. 
In 1997 fifteen oil companies were sued for exchanging detailed salary information and 
discussing the budgets for wages paid to managerial, professional and technical 
employees. And in 2011 several high technology companies like Google, Apple, Adobe, 
Intel, Intuit and Pixar were accused of undertaking no-solicitation agreements (also 
known as no-poaching agreements) against their technical engineers. Although in both 
cases firms succeeded in suppressing the wages paid to highly productive workers with 
specific technical skills, they were not able to affect the wages of the many non-
specialized workers they employ to perform routine activities and less demanding tasks, 
who are usually hired in larger and more competitive labor markets. Once the two types 
of workers have some degree of substitutability and can be used in different 
combinations to achieve the same final output, this clearly suggests that, in many cases, 
firms are only able to collude about the price of some inputs. 
Interestingly, we find in this chapter that the effects of semi-collusion in the labor 
market do not differ too much from those obtained when firms fix the price of all inputs. 
Indeed, we show not only that semi-collusion causes the wages and employment of 
specialized workers to fall, but it also indirectly leads to collusion in the final good 
market, by creating an incentive for firms to reduce production and to increase prices. 
The different levels of the economic variables under semi-collusion and competition are 
the result of the elimination of the business stealing effect and labor force stealing 
effect, as well as a dynamic effect that is specific to semi-collusive games. 
The remainder of the Chapter 3 is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we present the 
general formal model consisting in a two-stage game with price and wage competition, 
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which will be used to analyze and compare the non-cooperative equilibrium with the 
collusive equilibrium. In the first stage firms either decide cooperatively or individually 
the wages paid to specialized workers and in the second stage firms set simultaneously 
(without neither cooperate nor communicate) the prices of the final good and the 
number of non-specialized employees hired. Because the model is solved by backward 
induction, we begin by solving the second stage in Section 3.3, next we provide the 
competitive solution for the first stage in Section 3.4 and we describe the collusive 
solution for the first stage in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we compare the results obtained 
in the two previous sections to identify the impact of semi-collusion on wages, 
employment, prices and quantities transacted. In Section 3.7 we discuss how results 
would change if, in the competitive scenario, the control variables were all set 
simultaneously. Finally, Section 3.8 concludes. 
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3.2. The model 
Consider an industry composed by   firms producing close substitute goods with 
technologies that combine two types of labor: highly qualified workers      , paid at the 
wage rate  , and non-specialized workers      , hired in a perfectly competitive labor 
market at the wage exogenously fixed at   . The production function             is 
concave and increases at decreasing rates with respect to any input. However any 
increase in one of the inputs raises the marginal productivity of the other. In 
mathematical notation: 
            
    
   
            
    
    
             
    
    
             
    
    
             
        
    
Because the final goods are not perfect substitutes, any firm   of the industry faces a 
continuous demand function                decreasing with respect to its own price 
and increasing with respect to the prices of the other firms. Similarly, we consider the 
job posts to be differentiated and hence each firm also faces a continuous specialized 
labor supply function                 that rises with   and falls with  : 
            
   
   
            
   
             
            
   
   
             
   
          
Given the production technologies and the information available about final good 
demand and labor supply, the firms of the industry repeatedly play a two-stage game in 
an infinite time horizon, which we will now describe.  
In the first stage of the game, all firms set the wage of specialized workers and hire the 
specialized labor force under two possible equilibrium behaviors. At the non-
cooperative equilibrium firms compete with each other and set the wage that optimizes 
their individual profits, taking the decisions of the other players as given. If, on the 
other hand, they are able to coordinate their strategies (labor market collusive 
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equilibrium), firms cooperatively set the wages of specialized workers that maximize 
joint profits.  In the latter case, as long as every firm earns a share of the collusion gains 
and the discount rate is sufficiently close to one, the collusive equilibrium can be 
sustained with the trigger strategies described in Friedman (1971) or any similar 
strategies.  
In the second stage, firms hire any amount of non-specialized labor they wish at the 
wage exogenously fixed, set the price of the good produced with the two types of labor 
and sell it to the final consumer. Naturally they are always subject to the constraint that 
total sales cannot overcome the total production level. At this stage firms are not able to 
collude in any dimension.
6
  
It is important to briefly discuss why was the model set up in this particular sequence of 
events, that is, why have we assumed that the wage of specialized workers is 
determined before the remaining control variables. As it is commonly considered in the 
economic literature, wages are a relatively rigid variable that cannot be changed very 
often, especially in the case of high-skilled workers who are the hardest to attract and 
contract, while prices and employment of non-skilled labor can be more easily adapted 
to the short run. And so it seems reasonable to consider that once the wages are 
determined in the industry they cannot be changed again until the next period, while 
firms can still freely modify prices and employment of non-skilled workers. But if we 
think about the specific case of the collusive equilibrium, it is easy to understand that 
this particular sequence of events is, in fact, the only possible solution. Indeed, once the 
wages are centrally determined by the cartel, they cannot be changed anymore, but 
firms are still able to take advantage of any unilateral profitable deviations by changing 
their prices and amounts of non-specialized labor to improve their individual profits. 
Nevertheless, we cannot absolutely reject the hypothesis that all the decision variables 
can be set simultaneously in the non-cooperative equilibrium. In Section 3.7 we discuss 
how the results would be affected in such case. 
Next we solve the standard two-stage model following the usual backward induction 
procedure and thereby we start by determining the equilibrium at the second stage. 
                                                   
6
 The inability of firms to collude in the second stage may result from the absence of market power in the 
non-specialized labor market and from the actions of competition authority to prevent cooperative price-
fixing. Alternatively we can assume that firms are not able to coordinate all decision variables due to 
asymmetry of information or that they simply prefer to compete in some dimensions. 
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3.3. Second stage  
At the second stage of the game the rational firm chooses the price of the final good and 
the amount of non specialized labor that optimize its profits, holding the decisions of the 
other firms fixed. The firm is also constrained by its production technology, as it must 
acquire the necessary inputs to produce any output sold. At this point the wages of 
specialized workers can be treated as mere parameters of the model, because they have 
already been determined in the previous stage and cannot be changed anymore. Then 
the optimizing problem can be formally expressed as: 
                
                              
                                           
To solve this problem we set up the Lagrangian function and introduce the Lagrange 
multiplier   , which can be interpreted as the shadow price of the final good. 
                                       
                                    
As long as the sufficient conditions hold            
                  
 
 
     , 
the optimization problem is well defined and has an interior solution, which can be 
found using the following first order conditions: 
First order condition with respect to   : 
      
   
                 
      
   
   
      
   
       
                 
      
   
                                                
First order conditions with respect to    : 
      
    
               
      
    
              
    
   
                     
First order conditions with respect to   : 
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Because our variables of interest are     and   , equation (3.3.2) can be used to 
eliminate the shadow price from equation (3.3.1), so that first order conditions are 
rewritten as: 
                                                                       
                  
    
   
 
            
   
                                
Equation (3.3.4) is simply the production technology constraint. Equation (3.3.5) states 
that under optimal behavior the marginal impact on profits of a slight price change must 
be null. In other words, when an optimizing firm increases the price in one unit, the 
extra unit of money it earns for each unit of product sold must exactly offset the loss of 
sales resulting from the fall in demand.  
Applying equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) to every firm gives the equilibrium prices and 
employment levels of non-specialized labor as a function of the wages of specialized 
workers,            and             .  
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3.4. Non-cooperative outcome in the first stage of the game 
Now that we have predicted how the firms of the industry will behave in the second 
stage of the game for given wage levels, we have the necessary information to 
determine the solution in the first stage, which will crucially depend on whether the 
firms act non-cooperatively or successfully coordinate strategies. We begin by studying 
the non-cooperative solution. 
As usual, in the non-cooperative equilibrium any firm of the industry chooses the wage 
level that optimizes its profits holding fixed the decisions of the other players. But since 
a rational firm is able to predict the behavior of the industry in the second stage, it will 
not only measure the direct impact of the wage on profits through total costs and 
production capacity, but it will also account for the repercussions of the wage on future 
decisions about prices and employment levels of non-specialized workers, which affect 
profits as well. The maximizing problem of the firm can be therefore formally 
represented as: 
                                                              
                
                                                                      
As we can see, the prices and employment levels of non-specialized workers appear in 
the expression as a function of wages. To solve this problem we set up again the 
Lagrange function, whose Lagrange multiplier is also a function of wages: 
                                             
                               
                                         
                                 
Given the assumptions we have made about the product demand, labor supply and 
production functions, the Lagrangian is concave and has an interior optimal solution at 
the point where its derivative with respect to the wage is equal to zero: 
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Splitting and rearranging the components of the last term allows us to rewrite the first 
order condition as: 
      
   
                      
      
   
      
   
 
 
   
  
             
      
   
    
      
   
       
      
    
    
       
   
  
 
      
   
                 
The last expression can be further simplified using the first order conditions previously 
obtained for   ,     and      . From equation (3.3.4) we know that the production level 
must met the quantity demanded for the final good, that is,            . Equation 
(3.3.2) can be used to express the shadow price as the cost of producing one unit of the 
final good using non-specialized labor,         
       
      
. Replacing these two results in 
the previous equation: 
      
   
                
       
   
   
      
   
      
   
 
 
   
  
          
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
    
Breaking the terms inside the sum gives: 
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Finally, equation (3.3.5) can be used to replace                
       
   
 
      
   
 by zero, 
allowing us to rewrite the first order condition with respect to the specialized labor 
wage as: 
          
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
  
          
       
   
   
      
   
      
   
 
   
   
                                  
As one would expect, equation (3.4.1) states that at the non-cooperative equilibrium no 
profitable deviations exist, that is, a small variation in the wage does not affect the 
profits of the firm. In the left-handed side of equation (3.4.1) we observe the three 
different effects of raising the wage of specialized workers in one unit: firstly, the firm 
loses one unit of money for each worker employed (first term of equation (3.4.1)); 
secondly, the firm is able to substitute some of the non-specialized labor force by 
specialized labor, saving thus in the wages paid to low-skilled employees (second term 
of equation (3.4.1)); and thirdly the remaining firms of the industry will react to the new 
wage with different price levels, which in turn will affect the total amount of the final 
good that firm   is able to sell (third term of equation (3.4.1)).  
The last effect of augmenting the wage is probably the most interesting and unexpected, 
since it results from the specific dynamics of this game. Its sign depends on how the 
equilibrium prices in the second stage react to a change in the wage level, 
              . 
In Appendix C we perform a comparative-static analysis to prove that the marginal 
effect of the wage of firm   on its own price is negative,             . Intuitively a 
firm that has already committed to a higher wage and employed a greater specialized 
labor force in the first stage has an incentive to increase the production level in the 
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second stage, which can only be sold at a lower price. Then we show in Appendix C 
that the marginal effect of the wage of firm   on the prices of the other firms, 
            can be either positive or negative, depending on the specific 
characteristics of the industry. In fact, the sign of            relies on the dimension 
of two distinct forces operating in different directions: on the one hand, when firm   
increases the wage, it gives a clear sign that it will reduce prices in the second stage and 
so the rest of the industry is likely to respond with lower prices as well; on the other 
hand, all other firms are now able to hire less specialized workers for the same wage 
levels and face a greater marginal cost of production, which induces them to raise 
prices.  
We classify industries in two different types according to the sign of           . In 
type A industries, job posts are well differentiated and final goods are very close 
substitutes (and so demand is very reactive to the prices of the alternative goods). As a 
result, the first force dominates the second and            is negative. In this case 
firms are usually more reluctant to increase wages as they do not want to trigger a price 
war – price war effect. 
In type B industries, because final goods are sufficiently different at the eyes of 
consumers and post jobs are close substitutes, the second force dominates the first and 
           is positive. When this occurs, firms have an extra temptation to raise the 
wage as a strategic move to undermine the production capacity of the remaining firms, 
forcing them to produce less and to charge higher prices. We call this move a shooting 
the moon strategy, since it is extremely sophisticated and risky to increase the wage not 
to attract additional workers, but to steal business from the rival companies of the 
industry without having to decrease the price. Such strategy can easily backfire when 
the whole industry attempts to shoot the moon, case in which every firm ends paying a 
greater salary without being able to steal any sales from other companies.  
As we will see later, the sign of            has an important role in the results of our 
thesis.  
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3.5. Collusive outcome in the first stage of the game 
To find the collusive equilibrium in the first stage of the game, we use similar 
procedures to those of the last section, except that the wage of specialized workers paid 
by a particular firm is now centrally determined to maximize the joint profits of the 
cartel. Here is the new optimization problem: 
                                                 
 
   
               
 
   
                
 
   
 
     
 
                                                          
 
                                                          
   
Note that, just as before, the wage is determined taking into account the impact it has on 
the future decisions of firms regarding prices and non-specialized labor hired. To solve 
the maximization problem we set the Lagrangian of the cartel. 
                                           
 
   
  
               
 
   
                
 
   
  
    
 
   
                                      
                                 
First order conditions require that at the interior optimal solution a small variation of the 
wage neither raises nor reduces the joint profits of the industry: 
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Once again, the expression above can be simplified with the first order conditions 
obtained in the second stage of the game. Using equation (3.3.2) to get rid of the 
Lagrangian multiplier and equation (3.3.4) to eliminate the last term: 
  
      
   
      
 
   
            
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
 
   
 
 
   
  
            
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
 
 
   
    
Splitting the term  
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At last, from equation (3.3.5) we know that                
       
   
 
      
   
   and so 
the final expression for the first order condition with respect to the wage of highly 
skilled workers is: 
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In conclusion, when the firms of the industry form a cartel in the labor market, the wage 
paid by a particular firm is established to optimize the joint profits of the whole 
industry, which are affected through three different channels. Firstly, when the wage of 
firm   increases in one unit, the cartel loses one unit of money for each worker 
employed at that firm. Secondly, an increase in the wage of firm   has a positive effect 
on the specialized labor force of that firm, but a negative effect on the other companies, 
who are compelled to hire more unskilled workers. And finally, a change in the wage is 
replied with changes in prices and quantities, affecting the sales revenues of every firm.  
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3.6. Non-cooperative equilibrium vs. collusive equilibrium 
Once it has been determined how the firms in the industry strategically interact under 
competitive and collusive settings, we can perform a comparative static analysis 
between the two equilibria to predict the effects of collusion in the labor market on the 
main economic variables. Starting by the impact of collusion on the wage of specialized 
workers, we use the first order conditions in equations (3.4.1) and (3.5.1) to compute the 
difference between the marginal effect of the wage on the joint profits of the industry 
and on the profit of the firm: 
  
  
   
 
   
   
            
       
   
 
      
   
      
   
 
   
   
     
      
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
         
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
    
 
 
 
   
   
                    
As long as that difference is negative, a positive variation in the wage paid by firm   to 
specialized workers has a greater impact on its own individual profits than on the profits 
of the whole cartel  
   
   
 
  
   
 , meaning that under competition any firm is willing to 
set a higher wage and to employ more specialized workers. To prove that the difference 
between the two marginal effects is, indeed, negative, we must analyze the meaning and 
sign of each of the three components in the right-handed side of equation (3.6.1). For 
now we consider only type A industries where 
      
   
 is negative. 
The first component of equation (3.6.1),            
       
   
 
      
   
      
   
       , can be 
interpreted as the business stealing effect: when a firm in the industry increases the 
wage paid to specialized workers and expands its productive capacity, it is forced to 
reduce the price of the final good to meet the new production levels. And, as a result, 
the firm ends up stealing indirectly some sales from the rival companies. At the 
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collusive equilibrium firms refrain from hurting each other and eliminate the business 
stealing effect.  
As regards to the sign of this component, the term 
      
   
 is proved to be negative in 
Appendix C, 
      
   
 is positive by definition and                     corresponds to 
the mark-up of the final good (price minus the marginal cost expressed in terms of non-
specialized labor), which is clearly positive for any   or firms would be producing 
unprofitable units of product. Indeed, from equation (3.3.5): 
            
    
   
 
      
   
              
    
   
  
     
          
     
     
    
   
    
Because the product of the three terms in the first component of equation (3.6.1) is 
negative, the elimination of the business stealing effect leads to lower wages under 
collusion.  
The second component of equation (3.6.1),      
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
       , 
corresponds to the (specialized) labor force stealing effect: when the same firm of the 
industry raises the wage to its individually optimal level, it steals specialized workers 
from the other firms, who incur in extra costs to use non skilled labor instead. Under 
collusion the labor force stealing effect is eliminated, since firms account for the loss 
imposed on the rest of the industry when they attempt to steal workers from each other. 
While the sign of            is negative by definition, the term   
       
   
      
   
    
(which can be interpreted as the additional cost of using non specialized labor to make 
the job of one highly skilled worker) is always positive in type A industries, or firms 
would prefer to use only non specialized workers to produce the whole output. In fact, 
rearranging equation (3.4.1) gives:  
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As we can see above, for              the right-handed side of the last equation is 
positive and so the term   
       
   
      
   
    in the left-handed side must be positive as 
well. Because the product of the two terms of the labor force stealing effect is negative, 
its elimination also leads to lower wages under collusion. 
The final component of equation (3.6.1),            
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
   
       , 
corresponds to an intensification of the price war effect. As we have already seen, at the 
non-cooperative equilibrium firms in type A industries avoid raising wages too much, as 
they do not want to trigger a price war in the second stage. But under collusion, an 
optimizing firm does not only internalize the costs of a price war on its own profits, but 
on the profitability of the whole industry. As a result, at the cooperative equilibrium 
firms decrease wages paid to specialized workers even more due to an amplification of 
the price war effect. 
It is easy to show that the sign of this component is also negative, since the mark-up 
         
       
   
  is positive and the term  
      
   
      
   
   
   
   
 is negative in type A 
industries.  
Given the negative signs of the three different components in the right-handed side of 
equation (3.6.1) we verify that 
  
   
 
   
   
   and hence the wages paid to non 
specialized workers are lower under collusion. The difference between the wage levels 
in the two distinct scenarios is the result of the elimination of the business stealing 
effect, the labor force stealing effect and the amplification of the price war effect.  
Interestingly things are slightly different as far as type B industries are concerned, where 
           is positive. For those firms, shooting the moon strategies are so appealing 
that at the non-cooperative equilibrium firms commit to very high wages and overly 
employ specialized workers in order to enforce the other companies to practice high 
prices, even though it would be cheaper to produce the same output level with more 
intensive combinations of non skilled labor. As we prove below, for            large 
enough, the term   
       
   
      
   
    is negative and the second component in equation 
(3.6.1), which represents the elimination of the labor force stealing effect, becomes 
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positive. This means that under collusion firms get an incentive to augment wages in 
order to relief the other firms from the excessive specialized labor force they have. 
From equation (3.4.1): 
   
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
                
       
   
   
      
   
      
   
 
   
   
 
       
       
   
      
   
                                     
In addition, in type B industries where            is positive, the third component of 
equation (3.6.1) also becomes positive and can be now interpreted as an intensification 
of the shooting the moon strategies. In this type of industries, an optimizing firm 
operating in a cartel has an extra incentive to keep high wages, as it accounts for a 
positive side effect of the shooting the moon strategy on the profits of the other firms, 
who are able to increase their sales due to the higher prices practiced in the rest of the 
industry. 
Despite the positive signs of the labor force stealing effect and shooting the moon 
strategies in type B industries, we show in Appendix F that the business stealing effect 
component remains negative and offsets the other two components. As a result the 
wages paid to specialized workers prevail lower under collusion. 
With regard to the impact of collusion on the other economic variables, we compute 
their average behavior using symmetry. 
Given that the firms of a cartel pay on average lower wages, the effect of collusion on 
the employment of specialized workers can be directly inferred from the labor supply 
functions. Under symmetry, 
                
          
 
  
As the total specialized labor supply            is positively correlated with every 
 , when firms undertake cooperative agreements to reduce wages they are able to hire 
fewer specialized workers. 
Concerning the prices of the final good, it has already been discussed how the firms of 
the industry react when one particular firm decreases the wage. Now we are interested 
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in predicting the reaction of the industry when all firms decrease the wage or, similarly, 
when they all hire less specialized workers. In Appendix G we show that as a result of 
their smaller productive capacity their best reply is to charge a higher price. And given 
the market demand functions and the symmetry assumption, this means that firms are 
able to sell less: 
               
          
 
  
Ultimately, the impact of collusion in the employment level of non specialized labor is 
undetermined. The ambiguity of the sign results from two opposing forces. When the 
industry forms a cartel and sets lower wages for specialized workers, firms are able to 
attract a smaller amount of highly skilled labor and, for the same production level, they 
need more non-specialized workers than before (substitution effect). On the other hand 
when firms set lower wages they have an incentive to produce less in the second stage 
of the game and thus to hire fewer non-specialized workers as well, whose marginal 
productivity is now smaller (scale effect). 
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3.7. Simultaneous competitive game 
We have asserted that the sequential order of decisions in the two stage game previously 
described is the only adequate way to model the semi-collusive interaction between 
firms who cooperatively fix the wages of specialized workers. After all, if the prices and 
employment levels of non-specialized labor were non-cooperatively defined firstly, 
once the wages were centrally determined firms would choose new prices and 
employment levels to optimize their individual profits. The sequentiality of the two 
stage model also seems acceptable in the free competition scenario, because wages of 
specialized labor are often a variable more rigid than prices and low-skilled workers 
hired. Notwithstanding we cannot discard the hypothesis that under free competition all 
variables are set simultaneously. In that case, despite the first order conditions given in 
equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) remaining the same, the wage of specialized workers is 
now set to optimize individual profits without considering any future impact on prices 
and non skilled labor. That is, wages are set to solve the following optimization 
problem: 
                         
                              
                                           
The Lagrangian function of the firm becomes 
                                                                           
and the first order condition is: 
      
   
                  
      
   
   
      
   
      
   
       
              
      
   
    
      
   
    
Substituting    by equation (3.3.2): 
          
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
                                  
The only difference between equations (3.4.1) and (3.7.1) is the absence in the last of 
the dynamic effect of wages on future decisions about prices. In fact, because all 
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variables are now set simultaneously, the price war or shooting the moon effect 
disappears. Howsoever, when the cartel is formed, the artificial rigidity imposed on 
wages reintroduces the dynamic effect and firms become capable of affecting prices and 
employment levels of non specialized workers through changes in wages of specialized 
workers. For that reason, the difference between the marginal effect of the wage on the 
profits of the industry and on the profit of the firm has now a slightly different 
expression: 
  
   
 
   
   
            
       
   
 
      
   
      
   
 
   
   
      
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
         
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
    
 
  
   
                 
We observe in equation (3.7.2) that the formation of a cartel still eliminates the business 
stealing effect and the (specialized) labor stealing effect, but now it also creates the 
dynamic mechanism through which firms can use wages to influence the prices of the 
industry and total sales. Thus the third component of the right-handed side of equation 
(3.7.2) represents not a mere intensification of effects, but the creation of the price war 
effect or shooting the moon effect, which did not exist at the simultaneous non-
cooperative equilibrium.  
While it is easy to see that the three components of equation (3.7.2) are negative in type 
A industries, in Appendix H we prove that 
  
   
 
   
   
 remains negative in type B 
industries, so that wages are, as always, lower under collusion. 
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3.8. Conclusions 
Chapter 3 investigates the relation between semi-collusion in the labor market and 
collusion in the final good market. When we came up with the idea of addressing this 
subject for the first time, we were immediately suggested by conventional wisdom that 
firms who cooperatively fix lower wages have access to cheaper cost technologies and 
are able, thereby, to produce more at lower prices. As we have already shown in 
Chapter 2, this is of course not the case under one input production functions, where 
there is a perfect and direct relation between the two types of collusion: any central 
decisions to decrease wages reduces the number of workers that firms are able to hire 
and their productive capacity, forcing them to raise prices. In Chapter 3 we attempted to 
break the direct relation between collusion in the labor market and collusion in the final 
good market by allowing firms to use a second input of production, non-specialized 
workers, over whom they have absolutely no power to affect wages. Nevertheless, the 
qualitative results remained surprisingly similar to the previous ones, although they 
were now obtained under a much more general and realistic setting where the 
interaction between players became substantially complex.  
Indeed we have shown in a two-stage game model with two-input production functions 
that when firms interact cooperatively in the labor market, their only mechanism 
available to reduce wages is to accept lower levels of employment of specialized 
workers, which constrains their productive capacity. Even though firms can replace 
some of the specialized labor by unskilled workers, it is still in their own interest to 
produce less and to charge higher prices. And so collusion in the labor market leads, as 
always, to collusion in the final good market. 
In the absence of more specific assumptions about demand, supply and production 
functions, it is not possible to determine in what direction collusion affects the 
employment of non-specialized labor. One the one hand, at the collusive equilibrium 
companies hire less specialized workers and thus they must use additional low-skilled 
employees as an alternative input to obtain the same output level (substitution effect). 
On the other hand, because at the collusive equilibrium production levels are smaller, 
firms employ less of every input, including non-specialized labor (scale effect). 
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The economic motivation for the cartel to coordinate lower wages and higher prices 
depends on the particular characteristics of the industry. We consider two types of 
industries which we discuss in turn. 
In type A industries, where job posts are very differentiated and final goods are close 
substitutes, the low wage levels fixed under collusion result from the ability of the cartel 
to eliminate the business stealing effect and the labor force stealing effect and to 
amplify the price war effect. In other words, the cartel eliminates the individual 
temptation of firms to steal market quotas and specialized workers from each other and 
prevents them from triggering price wars. 
In type B industries, where jobs posts are very close substitutes and final goods are 
sufficiently differentiated, wages are still lower under collusion due to the elimination 
of the business stealing effect, even though the cartel rationally prevents wages from 
falling too much, as it accounts for the positive side effects of the labor force stealing 
effect and shooting the moon strategies. 
In conclusion, we hope to contribute with this work to an evolution of economic policy 
towards a greater protection of the consumer and the worker. We believe the application 
of our theory can actually improve the level of competition in markets, which is so 
essential to the efficient operation of the free market system. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Collusive Scene Investigation 
A modern empirical approach to uncover cartels  
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4.1. Introduction 
As a result of the actions of cartels, millions of people have access denied everyday to a 
large variety of goods and services that are too expensive for their own budgets, 
although the markets could efficiently provide them at low prices. The individuals who 
afford such expensive goods are forced to pay for them a greater fraction of their 
income and so they are able to buy less of alternative goods. The downstream 
companies that rely on intermediate products supplied by a cartel face higher costs and 
are forced to charge higher prices to their customers as well, having less money 
available to distribute between their workers, administrators and shareholders. By 
reducing the level of output transacted, cartels are also a source of low employment 
levels and even low wages, particularly among highly skilled workers who have 
invested considerable time and money on formation and training. But worse of all, 
because collusion is not a zero sum game, the gains earned by cartelized industries are 
far exceeded by the damage imposed on the costumers, workers, administrators and 
shareholders of all honorable firms that are somehow affected by cartels, causing 
society to lose as a whole in a manner that can hardly by measured. 
Unlike more traditional crimes as murder, robbery, bribery, extortion and fraud, which 
affect the integrity and wealth of individuals in a very perceivable way, the costs of 
collusion are dispersed over a large number of victims who rarely realize they have 
been injured at all, making collusion extremely hard to detect. Even so, every time a 
cartel fixes prices or restrains competition in the internal markets, a trace is left in the 
pattern of economic data that can be tracked by proper statistical tools. Therefore, in the 
same way murders and robberies are investigated with advanced techniques of forensic 
science to analyze DNA, fingerprints, footwear impressions and blood spatter, it is 
possible to develop analogous advanced econometric methods to screen the data and to 
constantly seek evidence of collusion. 
While the empirical analysis of economic data may be extremely useful to uncover 
cartels that have successfully remained in secret so far, it is important to keep in mind 
that these methods cannot be used as hard evidence to prove guilt in the court of law. 
Nevertheless, we believe they can still be applied as, using the wording of Harrington 
(2005), a screening and verification device to identify the industries worthy of further 
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investigation and prosecution. It should be the main purpose of these methods to 
improve an efficient allocation of antitrust authorities’ resources towards the industries 
whose likelihood of collusion is higher and whose estimated costs on welfare are more 
severe, contributing to an increasing number of uncovered cartels. Moreover, in case 
hard evidence is collected and firms are actually condemned, the same empirical 
methods can many times be used to estimate the overcharge of the cartel, in order to 
determine the adequate fee or sentence. 
There are already some empirical models of collusion detection in the literature, which 
we divide in three main groups: the models based on statistical features of data, the ones 
based on structural breaks and those based on price-cost margins. The models in the 
first group attempt to identify features of data that are consistent with either competition 
or collusion, by testing, for example, if price levels are correlated after controlling for 
demand or cost factors. In this respect, Bajari and Ye (2003) test for the presence of 
collusion in procurement auctions conducted by construction firms of the seal coating 
industry in Midwest, between 1994 and 1998. Their methodology involves testing 
whether firms’ bids are independent and exchangeable (that is, if a permutation of the 
costs of firms leads to a permutation of their bids), two properties that should be 
verified in a competitive bidding scenario. Similar tests were conducted earlier by 
Porter and Zona (1993) and Baldwin, Marshall and Richard (1997), who respectively 
studied bidder collusion by state highways construction firms in Long Island in the 80s 
and collusion between purchasers of timber of the Forest Service in Pacific Northwest, 
in the 70s. In our view, the main limitation of these models is that they are narrowed to 
detect collusion in auctions and they cannot be extended easily to the analysis of other 
industries, where properties like independence and exchangeability may fail to 
distinguish collusion from competition. 
The second group of models searches for structural breaks in time series, which are 
usually observed at the moments cartels are either created or closed. As long as there is 
some a priori information that may suggest possible breakpoints in data resulting from 
the formation or closure of a cartel (for example, periods with a considerable number of 
entries, exits or mergers), structural changes can easily be checked using a Chow test 
(1960). If the econometrician does not have any clues about possible breakpoints in 
data, a structural change in the whole time series can still be sought by following, for 
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instance, the test proposed by Quandt (1960). In any case, one must be very cautious 
with this approach, since the structural break may be triggered by other reasons than 
collusion. A much more refined technique based on structural breaks was followed by 
Porter (1983) to identify the periods of time at which the Joint Executive Committee 
was operational, a famous railroad cartel in the 1880s that faced alternative periods of 
cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. His method consists in the joint estimation 
of two simple linear equations, a homogeneous product market demand and a switching 
regression characterizing the supply relationship of the industry with two possible 
regimes: collusion and competition. Using a version of the EM algorithm for the 
estimation of switching regressions, Porter was able to identify the regime observed in 
each period. Since then some authors have extended Porter’s model to other industries, 
as Almoguera, Douglas and Herrera (2007), who studied the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) between 1974 and 2004 and tested for switches between 
collusive and non-cooperative periods. 
The third group of models measures price-cost margins or other performance indices to 
access the degree of market power in the industry and to predict collusion. The relation 
between market performance and market conduct goes back to Bain (1951), who is 
credited for the development of the structure, conduct and performance paradigm that 
has dominated empirical industrial economics in the second half of the twentieth 
century. However, attempting to compare price-cost margins across markets or 
industries to detect possible cartels has considerable shortcomings. Foremost, there is 
rarely good cost data available in most economic databases and so these models are 
required to use indirect methods based on cost estimations (in this respect, see 
Bresnahan, 1989). But even more importantly, since price-cost margins depend on so 
many economic factors as product’s characteristics, degree of differentiation, market 
size, patents, barriers to entry and regulation, high margins are not exclusively observed 
in cartels, as there are many profitable industries without any evidence of collusion. 
Instead of looking to the whole size of margins, a more modern approach uses economic 
theory to decompose the observed price-cost margins in unilateral and coordinated 
effects, and then to test whether the later is statistically significant. A model of this kind 
usually involves the estimation of demand functions and the mathematical computation 
of several price competition equilibria, in order to determine the unilateral effect of the 
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price-cost margin that results from product differentiation, the unilateral effect that 
comes from market structure and the coordinated effect that results from collusion. This 
approach was initially developed by Nevo (2001) to show the absence of coordinated 
strategies in the breakfast cereal industry in the United States and it was then followed 
by Slade (2004) to study the brewing industry in the United Kingdom. One must keep in 
mind though that the coordinated effect estimated highly depends on the hypothesis that 
the behavior of the firms is accurately described by the theoretical models used to 
compute the different equilibria. 
Despite the wide range of empirical models to detect collusion in the economic 
literature, so far none has been systematically used by competition authorities, whose 
investigation continues to rely mainly on consumer complaints. In reality, most models 
are still too complex, hard to implement, require the collection of a lot of data and must 
be adjusted case-by-case, creating a great problem for competition authorities who lack 
the time and resources to investigate every industry in such detail. Furthermore, there is 
still little evidence that those models are able, indeed, to accurately distinguish 
competition from collusion, once they have not been rigorously tested in the two 
distinct scenarios. For that reason, it is our purpose not only to develop a parsimonious 
and computationally efficient algorithm that can be easily applied by antitrust 
authorities to detect collusion, but also to prove that our approach is robust and 
accurate.  
The method proposed in this thesis belongs to the group of models based on structural 
breaks and is related to Porter (1983), involving the estimation of the supply side of the 
industry as a switching regression. There are two important features that distinguish our 
model from Porter’s. Firstly, we do not estimate the demand equation, which is 
particularly useful when we do not know its functional form or we do not observe many 
demand side variables. Secondly, our switching regression is estimated with a modified 
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm that only uses analytical estimators (like 
TSLS) at each iterative step. This makes our method fast, easy to compute and less 
sensitive to initial points.   
Using simulated data, we show that our algorithm is able to accurately predict collusion 
and, under specified conditions, to obtain consistent and unbiased estimates for the 
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parameters of the switching regression. We also show that the algorithm is able to 
correct any estimation bias that may result from the misidentification of the regimes and 
from the identification problem of the supply equation. Resorting to simulated data has 
the enormous advantage of knowing exactly when firms are colluding and having 
access to the real parameters of the population, which enable us to determine the 
success rate of the method and to evaluate how close the estimates obtained are to the 
true underlying values. A similar procedure was followed by Paha (2011), who 
simulated an industry in order to evaluate different empirical methods to determine the 
overcharge of cartels. In addition, generating our own data allows us to perform 
sensitivity analysis to study how results are affected by changes in the parameters or 
even to create multiple samples with very large number of observations, in order to 
check statistical properties such as consistency and unbiasedness.  
In the next section we distinguish different types of switching regressions and explain 
how they can be applied as a method of collusion detection. It is also shown how the 
switching regression that suits best our interests can be estimated using an expectation-
maximization algorithm. In Section 4.3 we identify the estimation bias that results from 
the misidentification of the regimes and we explain how it can be avoided. In Section 
4.4 we discuss the identification problem of the supply equation due to the endogeneity 
of the quantity transacted. In Section 4.5 we present a new EM algorithm which solves 
the identification problem and, under most conditions, is able to estimate consistently 
the parameters of the switching regression. Section 4.6 discusses a statistical test for 
structural breaks. Lastly, Section 4.7 concludes.   
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4.2. Switching regressions and the EM algorithm 
Switching regression models have been increasingly applied to the analysis of various 
economic problems where the variable of interest is a function of structural parameters 
that vary across two or more regimes. When studying the cooperative behavior between 
firms, the variable of interest is usually the price and the two regimes are competition 
and collusion. In a simple industry where firms are price setters and the product is 
homogeneous, the supply side of the market would be described typically by a 
switching regression of the type 
    
           
                               
           
                          
                     
where    is the price,     is the marginal cost,    is the quantity produced and   
  and 
  
  are normal unobserved errors. If we were able to observe the regime in action at time 
 , this model could be easily solved by separately estimating the two previous 
regression by ordinary least squares. Alternatively we could create a dummy variable    
that takes the value 1 in collusive periods and 0 otherwise and estimate by OLS the 
regression: 
                                                                 
Notwithstanding, the regime operating at time   is not observed and we face the more 
complex challenge of estimating not only the structural parameters    and   , but also 
the state variable   . One possible approach to overcome such problem is frequently 
attributed to Goldfeld and Quandt (1972) and it involves seeking for an additional set of 
exogenous variables    that can somehow predict the regime observed each period. 
Following this methodology, the previous switching regression model would be 
rewritten as 
    
           
           
           
            
                                    
and the unknown parameters could now be estimated by maximum likelihood or by a 
Tobit model. Yet we do not always have many variables available that can accurately 
explain the cooperative behavior of firms along time. In fact, it is precisely our problem 
to detect periods of collusion without any other information but the data available on the 
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supply side of the industry. And so, while Goldfeld and Quandt’s method could be 
useful to estimate the parameters of the supply function if we already had some way to 
distinguish collusion from competition, it is our main goal to create such detecting 
mechanism. 
Another approach that suits better our purposes was proposed by Quandt (1972), who 
presented a new switching regression model where the observations are generated by 
each regime with a constant but unknown probability: 
    
           
                            
           
                       
                         
Here   is the probability of collusion and     the probability of competition. This 
problem is also identified sometimes in the literature as a mixture of normal 
distributions, once the explained variable price is generated by two normal distributions 
with different means and variances. Kiefer (1978) proved that there is an unique 
consistent and asymptotically efficient estimator for the coefficients of a switching 
regression of this kind, which corresponds to a local maximum of the likelihood 
function 
                                    
 
   
                          
where     is the probability density function of the normal variable    conditional on 
that a specific regime was observed. Nevertheless, because the maximizing conditions 
of the likelihood function above are non-linear and have several roots, it is not easy to 
detect which of them corresponds to our consistent estimator. One common solution is 
to use an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm, an iterative method that is usually 
capable of successfully converging to the consistent root and which we will now briefly 
explain. 
Consider the switching regression in (4.2.4) rewritten as 
                                
                      
                
               
 and define   as the probability of      conditional on the observation of   , 
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Given an initial guess for the unobserved variable   , it is relatively easy to obtain 
initial estimates for the parameters   ,    and   by maximizing, for instance, the 
likelihood function 
             
 
   
                                            
Alternatively, one can follow Kiefer (1980) and simply estimate by least squares the 
regression 
                                                               
This corresponds to the maximization step of the EM algorithm. The initial guesses for 
   can be used further to compute the unconditional probability of collusion   as the 
mean of all conditional probabilities: 
     
 
   
                                                                
Next, at the expectation step of the algorithm we must revise our expectations of the 
conditional probability of collusion  , taking into account the estimates obtained in the 
previous step. Using Bayes rule, 
              
                  
                                     
    
   
              
                                 
                          
Given the new values for   , new estimates for the parameters   ,   ,   and   can be 
obtained. The maximization and expectation steps are then iteratively repeated until 
convergence is reached (usually the algorithm stops when the coefficient of correlation 
between two successive estimates of   series is near one). 
Kiefer (1980) proves that the estimates obtained by the EM algorithm correspond, in 
fact, to a local maximum of the likelihood function in (4.2.5). In the next section we 
will discuss the conditions under which the solution obtained is the consistent estimator 
and, otherwise, how we can deal with the estimation bias. 
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4.3. Dealing with the estimation bias 
In order to evaluate the capability of the EM algorithm to produce the consistent 
estimators of the switching regression in (4.2.6), we conduct several simulation 
experiments with sets of data randomly generated from a very simple model of the 
industry. The variables marginal cost     and quantity transacted    are assumed to be 
exogenous and they are randomly drawn from two normal distributions. The state 
variable    is a random variable drawn from a Bernoulli distribution that takes value 1 
(collusion) with success probability  . The observations for the dependent variable price 
(  ) are generated by equation (4.2.6). 
We simulate seven different types of populations or industries, whose true underlying 
parameters are listed in Table 1. For each population we extract a sample of 10 000 
observations and next we attempt to estimate consistently the parameters using a 
version for the EM algorithm we have written for Matlab and which is available in 
Appendix I. To guarantee that our results are not occasional, we replicate the simulation 
and estimation procedures 50 times for each population. Table 2 displays the estimates 
of the parameters obtained in average for the 50 replications. 
 
Population           
1 0.5 0.25 1 0.2 
2 0.5 0.25 2 0.2 
3 0.5 0.25 3 0.2 
4 0.5 0.25 4 0.2 
5 0.5 0.25 5 0.2 
6 0.5 0.25 5 0.8 
7 0.65 0.10 5 0.2 
 
The first five populations in study have the same underlying parameters except for an 
increasing standard deviation of the error term, which clearly has a very important role 
in the consistency of the results. In fact, while in the first two populations the estimates 
obtained are very accurate and nearly equal to the true parameters, when the volatility of 
the error is raised we start observing a growing estimation bias, which is particularly 
Table 1 – Parameters of the population in simulation 1  
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evident in population 5. We observe that the parameters   and   are both under 
estimated, while the difference between the parameters    and    is over estimated. 
 
Population               
 
 
1 0.5001 0.2500 0.9988 0.1992 0.9650 
2 0.5015 0.2506 1.9755 0.1998 0.8763 
3 0.5102 0.2460 2.7407 0.1995 0.7948 
4 0.5371 0.2441 3.3953 0.1915 0.7346 
5 0.5798 0.2408 4.1619 0.1651 0.6701 
6 0.5042 0.1657 4.1542 0.8330 0.6831 
7 0.6528 0.0965 4.8657 0.1998 0.8406 
 
To understand why estimates for populations 3 to 5 turned out to be biased, we illustrate 
graphically the sources of the estimation bias in a very simple example. For that 
purpose, consider that the average price observed at the industry depends only on the 
regime of interaction between firms, collusion or competition. That is, the price in 
period   is a switching regression of a constant term: 
                        
                      
                
                     
Consider further that we only have available the four observations represented in Figure 
1, of which the first two correspond to a collusive regime and the last two to a 
competitive regime. In this example, any reasonable estimation technique would be able 
to correctly distinguish the two regimes and to accurately estimate each constant term as 
the average value of the two corresponding observations, leading to consistent results.  
However, suppose now that the error term of equation (4.3.1) has a much higher 
standard deviation and that we observe instead the four occurrences in Figure 2, of 
which the first two correspond again to collusion and the last two to competition. 
Although according to Kiefer (1980) the likelihood function of the switching regression 
still has a local optimal at the point where the estimates are exactly equal to    and   , 
there is now a much more obvious global optimal to which any iterative algorithm will 
converge. Given that only the four dots in Figure 2 can be observed, our best guess is 
Table 2 – Average estimates of the OLS EM algorithm  
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that the two higher occurrences of    (at periods 2 and 4) are observed under collusion 
and the two lower occurrences (at periods 1 and 3) are observed under competition. And 
so the algorithm will estimate the two constant terms as the mean of those two pairs of 
observations, which are given by the dashed lines in graphic 2, leading therefore to 
estimation bias. 
 
       
We conclude from the example above that in switching regression models where the 
error term is too volatile, the iterative algorithm fails to identify the regime in some 
periods. Intuitively, when under collusion the price observed is very high, we are able to 
correctly identify the operative regime, but when the price is particularly low we 
misidentify the regime as competition. As a result, average collusive prices appear to be 
higher than what they are in reality and the parameters associated with collusion are 
overestimated. The opposite occurs at the competitive regime, whose average prices and 
parameters tend to be underestimated. 
In addition, because the lower prices under collusion and the higher prices under 
competition are classified in the opposite regime, some of the residuals become 
considerably smaller than the true errors of the population and thus the standard 
deviation   is also underestimated, as it is observed in Table 2.  
Finally, because the standard deviation   affects the probability density function of   , 
it follows directly from equations (4.2.10) and (4.2.11) that the conditional probabilities 
of collusion   and the unconditional probability   are inconsistently estimated as well. 
The direction of the estimation bias depends on the true value of  . As we can see in 
Figure 1 – Identification of the regimes Figure 2 – Misidentification of the regimes 
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Table 2,   is underestimated in populations 3 to 5, where the competitive regime is 
operational in most observations (      . But in population 6, where the true value of 
  is 0.8 and collusion dominates the sample,   is overestimated. 
In conclusion, despite the existence of a consistent root that maximizes locally the 
likelihood function in (4.2.5), when the switching regression model is not robust and the 
error has too much volatility, the consistent root is not tractable, once it is not possible 
to distinguish properly the two regimes. Any other factor that affects the overall quality 
of the model leads to the same problem. For instance, because population 7 has a higher 
   and a lower    than population 5 (while all the remaining parameters are the same), 
the explained part of the model is greater and the estimates obtained are consistent. 
Everything else equal, the greater the   is, the greater is the ability of the algorithm to 
converge to the consistent root of the switching regression model. In our simulation 
experience, for an    greater than 0.88 the estimates appear to be consistent and for an 
   around 0.79 the estimation bias is not significant. 
Since it is not always possible to estimate a model with an    above 0.8, it would be 
useful to somehow improve the ability of the EM algorithm to detect the consistent root 
when the model is not so strong. For that reason, we propose a small correction in the 
iterative process to obtain better results. Recall that in each maximization step of the 
version of the EM algorithm in Kiefer (1980), the beta coefficients are estimated given 
the conditional probabilities    obtained in the previous expectation step. That is, the 
maximization step computes the least squares estimates of the regression: 
                                                               
In our alternative version of the algorithm (see Appendix J), we propose to estimate the 
unknown coefficients taking into account our better prediction of the regime operating 
at time   or, in other words, to estimate the following regression by least squares: 
                                         
            
           
             
By replacing the conditional probabilities   , which range between 0 and 1, by the 
predicted regimes    , which can only assume the extreme values 0 or 1, it is our 
intention to avoid underestimating the standard deviation of the error. In fact, when the 
probabilities    are introduced in equation (4.3.2), the fitted prices depend on a linear 
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combination of the structural parameters of the two regimes and so the residuals become 
much smaller than the true errors, especially in observations whose prices are 
somewhere between the collusive and the competitive expected level. But when we use 
a variable     in equation (4.3.3) that can only assume the value 0 or 1, the fitted prices 
are located at one of the two extremes and the residuals are closer to the true errors.    
In order to address the quality of the new algorithm, we estimated again the coefficients 
of the seven populations with the same data samples used to compute the values in 
Table 2. The new estimation results are displayed in Table 3. 
 
Population               
 
 
1 0.5001 0.2500 0.9988 0.1992 0.9650 
2 0.5007 0.2506 1.9975 0.1998 0.8735 
3 0.4998 0.2473 2.9369 0.2000 0.7643 
4 0.5086 0.2453 3.7928 0.1943 0.6689 
5 0.5257 0.2406 4.6735 0.1756 0.5841 
6 0.5051 0.2205 4.6729 0.8224 0.5991 
7 0.6477 0.0970 4.9867 0.1998 0.8325 
 
It is remarkable that the estimates obtained by the new version of the EM algorithm are 
considerably closer to the true underlying parameters, with the exception of population 
1, whose estimates were already consistent. As we can observe in Table 3, the new 
algorithm converges now to the consistent estimator of the switching regression for an 
   higher than 0.76 and the estimation bias is still very small for an    around 0.67. 
Despite the considerable improvement in our estimation results, if it is our desire to run 
switching regressions with actual data and to detect real cartels, further modifications 
must be implemented in the algorithm in order to solve the identification problem. We 
address this issue in the next section.  
 
 
 
Table 3 – Average estimates of the modified OLS EM algorithm  
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4.4. The identification problem 
So far, for exposition purposes, we have discussed the estimation of a switching supply 
function in a very simplified scenario, where the variable price is endogenously set by 
firms and the quantity transacted is exogenous. Unfortunately, the later assumption does 
not usually hold in reality, since it is well established by economic theory that prices 
and quantities are both endogenously determined by a simultaneous system of equations 
composed by the market demand and supply functions. For that reason, we will now 
focus our analysis on the estimation of a more realistic model of the industry, where 
prices and quantities observed at time   are the solution of the following system: 
 
                                           
                           
                                      
The first equation is the market demand, in which    is the income.    and    are the 
error terms of the demand and supply functions, with zero mean and constant standard 
deviation. All the other variables have the same meaning as in Section 4.2.  
When prices and quantities are the solution of a system of this type, the econometrician 
typically observes a map of dispersed points as in Figure 3 and is not able to identify the 
demand and supply relationships by traditional estimation methods. To solve the 
identification problem, at least one exogenous variable must be observed in each 
equation of the system that does not appear in the other equation, like the income and 
the marginal cost in our example. This way, the econometrician can make sense of each 
price-quantity combination observed as a particular equilibrium that results from the 
dislocation of the demand and supply curves (Figure 4). 
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As long as the state variable    is observed data, there are several methods available to 
estimate some or all parameters of the system in (4.4.1). The most common procedure is 
either to estimate separately one of the equations using instrumental variables (generally 
by two-stages least squares – 2SLS) or to simultaneously estimate the whole system by 
three-stage least squares (3SLS). Alternatively one can use the limited information 
maximum likelihood (LIML) or the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) 
methods to obtain the analogous maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in 
one or both equations.  
On the other hand, when    is unknown as is our case, one of the methods above must 
be somehow combined with the switching regression techniques exposed in the earlier 
sections, turning the analysis much more complex. Such procedure was already 
conducted by Porter (1983), who successfully introduced the full information maximum 
likelihood method in the iterative steps of the EM algorithm, in order to identify the 
switching periods between collusion and competition of the Joint Executive Committee 
railroad cartel. However, we believe the estimation by full information maximum 
likelihood comes with several problems difficult to overcome. Firstly, the FIML 
estimation is computationally heavy, time consuming and extremely sensitive to initial 
points, making it hard to converge to the solution when the sample is large, the 
equations have atypical functional forms and if we do not have a good guess of the 
initial values. When applied to switching regressions it is even harder to converge, 
given that the FIML must be repeatedly run at each of the iterative steps of the EM 
Figure 3 – Identification problem Figure 4 – Solving the identification problem 
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algorithm. Secondly, the good properties of the FIML, like consistency and asymptotic 
efficiency, depend on the assumption that the distribution of the errors is well specified. 
And thirdly the FIML require us to estimate the whole system even if we do not have 
any clue about the functional form of the market demand or even if we have no interest 
in estimating it. 
Therefore, while the estimation of a switching regression using FIML seems achievable 
for a professional researcher focusing entirely on the analysis of a single industry, it 
does not seem so attractive for competition authorities who have limited time and 
resources to investigate more than a few industries. For that reason we propose a new 
EM algorithm that solves instead the identification problem using two-stage least 
squares, a simple and parsimonious analytical method that is easy to compute, has good 
properties and does not rely on much information a priori. In the following section we 
will briefly discuss the main modifications that need to be introduced in the 
maximization and expectation steps, in order to estimate the switching supply function 
in the system in (4.4.1).  
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4.5. An efficient EM algorithm 
Consider a dataset composed by two randomly generated time series,     and   , as 
well as two endogenous variables    and    that solve the system in (4.4.1). Suppose 
further it is our purpose to estimate only the switching supply function: 
                                                                
At the maximization step of the EM algorithm we must estimate the coefficients   ,    
and   for some given expectations of the regime variable   . Notwithstanding, it results 
from the demand equation that the market price has a feedback effect on the quantity 
that consumers are willing to buy, leading to correlation between    and   . As the OLS 
estimators are no longer consistent, we show how TSLS can be successfully employed 
to estimate the three parameters. Foremost, we split the system in (4.4.1) in two 
different subsystems, for      and for       
 
                   
                        
         
                                 
 
                   
                        
         
                                 
Solving each system with respect to    and    gives the reduced form equations for the 
quantity transacted as a function of the exogenous variables: 
                                                             
                                                            
Then, at the first stage of TSLS we estimate equations (4.5.4) and (4.5.5) by OLS and 
compute the fitted values of the quantity transacted conditional on collusion (    ) and 
conditional on competition (    ): 
                                                                         
                                                                        
At the second stage, we replace the quantities transacted by their fitted values in the 
supply functions and we simply estimate the new equations by OLS: 
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Alternatively, we may run the next equation by OLS: 
                                                                  
Remark that the predicted values of      and      are a function of exogenous variables 
and are not correlated with   . For that reason, equation (4.5.10) can be run by OLS to 
consistently estimate   ,    and  . 
At the expectation step of the new EM algorithm we must revise our expectations of the 
regime observed at time  , given the estimates obtained for the coefficients. Once there 
are now two endogenous variables, if we were able to estimate both the supply and 
demand equations of the system in (4.4.1), our best prediction of the likelihood of 
observing collusion at time   would be the probability that    was equal to one, 
conditional on the observations of    and   . Using Bayes rule: 
                  
 
                     
                                           
  
 
               
                                   
                          
Howsoever, since we are assuming we do not have enough information to estimate the 
demand equation, it is not possible to compute               and            
  , simply because we do not know the density function of the variable    that results 
from the demand equation. Instead we must determine the likelihood of observing 
collusion at time   as the probability that    is equal to one, conditional only on the 
observation of   : 
              
            
                             
                 
As before,   is calculated as the average of the conditional probabilities    obtained in 
the previous iteration of the algorithm. As regards to the probabilities of    conditional 
on a particular regime,            and           , they can be derived from the 
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probability density functions of    that result from the supply functions in (4.5.8) and 
(4.5.9): 
                          
 
                                
                          
 
                               
It is very important to note that the expected price at time   conditional on a specific 
regime,     or    , depends on the fitted quantity transacted for that regime and not on 
the quantity that was actually observed. For instance, if firms compete in period   and 
we want to estimate the price that would be observed at that time if they had colluded, 
we must account that collusion affects the quantity transacted as well (by increasing the 
price, it reduces the total quantity consumers are willing to buy). And so, the expected 
price under collusion at time   can be obtained from the collusive supply function, 
evaluated at the quantity that is predicted under the same regime – equation (4.5.8). The 
same is true for the expected price under competition. This reasoning is a natural 
extension of the mechanism behind the TSLS estimation to the expectation step of the 
EM algorithm. 
We have introduced the maximization and expectation steps previously described in a 
new version of the EM algorithm, which must now be tested using simulated data (the 
Matlab code is available in Appendix K). We consider six different types of 
populations, whose true underlying parameters are listed in Table 4 and whose prices 
and quantities are the solution of the system in (4.4.1). The six populations share the 
same beta and lambda coefficients, but have different standard deviations for the error 
terms.  
 
Pop.                        
1 50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 1 1 0.2 
2 50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 2 2 0.2 
3 50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 3 3 0.2 
4 50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 4 4 0.2 
5 50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 1 4 0.2 
6 50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 4 1 0.2 
 
Table 4 – True parameters of the populations in simulation 2  
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For each population we extract 50 random samples of 10 000 observations, which are 
used to compare the estimation results of the OLS EM algorithm with the estimation 
results of the new version of the EM algorithm based on TSLS. In Tables 5 and 6 we 
present the estimates obtained in average for the 50 replications using the two 
algorithms. 
From the observation of the first four populations in Table 5 we verify that the OLS EM 
algorithm systematically underestimates the two coefficients of the supply function,    
and   , as well as the probability of collusion  . The estimation bias grows 
exponentially when the standard deviation of the errors increases. Fortunately, the 
results obtained for the same four populations in Table 6 show that the TSLS EM 
algorithm successfully removes the estimation bias originated by the identification 
problem. Indeed, for the two models with an    above 0.87 the estimates are very 
accurate and for an    above 0.74 the estimation bias is almost irrelevant. Notice 
further that the relatively small estimation bias observed in the third and forth lines of 
Table 6 do not result from the endogeneity of the quantity transacted, but from the 
inability of the algorithm to identify the correct regime in some periods. This can be 
concluded from the fact that the estimates of    and    diverge from each other, in 
opposition to Table 5 where the two coefficients are both underestimated. 
Finally, it is possible to conclude from the results for population 5 and 6 that the error 
term of the supply function is the main source of the estimation bias caused by the 
identification problem, while the error of the demand function does not appear to be 
very relevant. 
 
Population                
 
 
1 0.4941 0.2455 0.9958 0.1993 0.9665 
2 0.4752 0.2297 1.9635 0.1908 0.8761 
3 0.4464 0.2004 2.9077 0.1658 0.7457 
4 0.4217 0.1625 3.9404 0.1188 0.5721 
5 0.4206 0.1607 3.9515 0.1155 0.5620 
6 0.4942 0.2456 0.9961 0.2000 0.9672 
 
Table 5 – Average estimates of the modified OLS EM algorithm  
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Population                
 
 
1 0.4999 0.2498 0.9986 0.2001 0.9663 
2 0.4993 0.2489 1.9813 0.1997 0.8738 
3 0.5004 0.2465 2.9213 0.1960 0.7434 
4 0.5085 0.2424 3.8559 0.1771 0.5903 
5 0.5087 0.2413 3.7393 0.1870 0.6079 
6 0.4987 0.2496 1.0624 0.1993 0.9627 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 – Average estimates of the TSLS EM algorithm  
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4.6. Testing for structural breaks 
We have developed a fast and parsimonious algorithm to consistently estimate the 
supply side of an industry as a regression that switches between two regimes, 
competition and collusion. All the previous analysis was developed under the 
assumption that structural breaks do exist, that is, it was assumed that each regime is 
observed at least in some periods. A relevant question that must now be addressed is 
how the algorithm behaves when no structural break occurs (  is equal to zero or one). 
Recall the switching regression in equation (4.5.1) and rewrite it in matrix notation: 
        
         
               
   
               
               
 
  
  
                     
When firms either compete or collude along the whole time series, the variable    or 
       is a row of zeros and the matrix of regressors   is singular. Therefore, if the 
EM algorithm is able to converge to the true values of the state variable, it will attempt 
at some point to invert a singular matrix during the maximization step, generating thus 
an error. 
Interestingly, the algorithm often converges instead to a meaningless random solution, 
estimating a value for lambda between zero and one and identifying both regimes in the 
dataset. Indeed, despite the absence of structural breaks, the EM algorithm allows the 
regime to switch along time in order to improve the fitting of the data, attributing the 
observations with high errors to collusion and the observations with low errors to 
competition. Unfortunately this means we cannot actually rely on the estimation output 
of the switching regression, unless we know for sure that the data was generated by a 
mixture of the two regimes. To overcome this problem we must implement some 
statistical test to check whether there is evidence for structural breaks. 
We may be initially tempted to use a Wald test or a likelihood ratio test to verify 
whether the fitted state variable    is statistically significant, case in which we conclude 
the time series is a mixture of two distinct regimes. However, the test statistics of the 
switching regression model do not have the traditional distributions under the null and 
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cannot be used to conduct such analysis. For that reason, several authors have proposed 
a modified likelihood ratio test to test the hypothesis of a homogeneous model against a 
mixture of two or more regimes
7
, as Chen and Kalbfleisch (2004) and Zhu and Zhang 
(2003). Still, these methods are quite hard to implement, as they involve finding lower 
and upper bounds and the asymptotic behavior of the distribution of the test statistic. 
Here we propose a much more simple and convenient approach. Instead of studying the 
extremely complex distribution of the switching regression’s estimator and test 
statistics, we focus our analysis on the simple TSLS estimation output. Consider again a 
dataset generated by system (4.4.1) and suppose we estimate the following regression 
by TSLS, using    as an instrumental variable: 
                                                                     
On the one hand, if the regime remains unchanged along time, the TSLS estimator is 
consistent and it follows directly that the residuals have a normal distribution, as 
observed in Figure 5.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                   
7
 For hypotheses tests of two against more regimes see Dannemann and Holzmann (2010). 
Figure 5 – Histogram of the residuals of a 
homogeneous model. 
Figure 6 – Histogram of the residuals of a 
mixture model. 
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On the other hand, if the time series has structural breaks separating the two regimes, 
the TSLS estimator is no longer consistent and the residuals are given by: 
    
                        
                        
                                    
where        is the TSLS estimator of regression (4.6.2). In other words, in the presence 
of structural breaks, the residuals are generated by a mixture of two normal 
distributions, as observed in Figure 6. 
The clear distinction between the two distributions in the homogeneous and mixture 
models can be used to obtain evidence for structural breaks. For instance, we can test 
for normality of the residuals following Jarque and Bera (1987), whose null hypothesis 
is that the residuals follow a normal distribution with unknown mean and variance. If 
the null is rejected, it raises suspicions that there are structural breaks and we can then 
run the EM algorithm to verify whether the industry is well explained by a switching 
regression model. 
We conduct several simulation experiments to evaluate the Jarque-Bera test as a tool to 
detect the presence of structural breaks in the time series. As before, we simulate an 
industry with random levels of income and marginal costs and we generate the prices 
and quantities transacted as a solution of the system (4.4.1). The true values of the 
parameters are as follows: 
 
                  
50 5 -2 0.5 0.25 1 
 
For each simulation experiment we collect a random sample of observations from the 
population, estimate equation (4.6.2) by TSLS to obtain the residuals and run the 
Jarque-Bera test for a 5% significance level. Then we replicate the previous steps 
several times and calculate the type I and type II errors, whose results are displayed in 
Table 8.  
To calculate the type I error we set   equal to 0, so that firms always compete and there 
are no structural breaks in the data. Next we compute the fraction of replications where 
Table 7 – Parameters of the population in simulation 3 
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the Jarque-Bera test rejects the null hypothesis of normality, suggesting structural 
breaks. To calculate the type II error we set   equal to 0.2 to obtain a sample with a 
mixture of collusive and competitive periods. Then we compute the fraction of 
replications where the Jarque-Bera test fails to reject the null hypothesis, suggesting a 
homogeneous model. 
 
Experiment Observations Replications    
Type I Error 
     
Type II Error 
       
1 10 000 100 2 0.05 0 
2 10 000 100 3 0.04 0 
3 10 000 100 4 0.09 0 
5 1000 500 2 0.06 0 
6 1000 500 3 0.032 0 
7 1000 500 4 0.044 0 
9 200 500 2 0.05 0 
10 200 500 3 0.05 0 
11 200 500 4 0.048 0.236 
12 100 500 2 0.054 0 
13 100 500 3 0.05 0.124 
14 100 500 4 0.058 0.666 
 
From the observation of Table 8 we conclude that, for all experiments, the type I error is 
very close to the 5% significance level, meaning that the test is well elaborated and can 
be used, indeed, to check for structural breaks. In addition, from the analysis of the type 
II error, we conclude that the power of the test is enormous (equal to one) when the 
number of observations is very large. Howsoever, when we collect a smaller sample of 
100 or 200 observations, the test may lose some power if the error term becomes too 
volatile. For instance, in experiment 13, for a sample of 100 observation and a standard 
deviation of the error equal to 3, the Jarque-Bera test fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of normality in 12,4% of the cases where the null is false. In order words, the power of 
the test is 0.876. The remaining experiments where the error type II is positive 
(experiments 11 and 14) are not so relevant because, as we saw in the previous sections, 
Table 8 – Jarque-Bera test  
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for an error term so erratic it is not possible to accurately distinguish the two regimes 
and the EM algorithm malfunctions anyway. 
The ability of the Jarque-Bera test to detect structural breaks depends, of course, on the 
assumption that the error terms of the homogeneous and mixture models follow in fact a 
normal distribution (actually almost all statistical inference depend on that assumption). 
While this should not represent a major problem for large samples in which the central 
limit theorem can be applied, for small samples it may be useful to run alternative tests 
to check whether the results remain valid using different distributions, as the logistic. 
In conclusion, the Jarque-Bera test appears to be an easy, fast and functional method to 
test for structural breaks. When it rejects the hypothesis of a homogeneous model, it can 
be complemented with the EM algorithm to verify if the industry can be accurately 
described by a switching regression of collusive and competitive regimes. 
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4.7. Conclusions 
The pattern of economic data is the result of multiple complex interactions in the 
economy, some of which correspond to socially valuable transactions and others to 
criminal activities with high social costs. Modern econometric tools can be used to 
dissect the available data and detect some of those criminal behaviors that would 
otherwise remain unknown. In Chapter 4 we are concerned, in particular, with the 
empirical detection of collusion through switching regression models. 
Although switching regressions have been broadly applied in various fields of social 
and natural sciences, the difficult estimation techniques behind them remain a black box 
for many researchers. We attempt here to get inside the black box in a controlled 
simulation environment in order to identify some common estimation problems, provide 
feasible solutions and present a better intuitive understanding of the results obtained.  
Firstly, we show that the traditional expectation-maximization algorithm often fails to 
converge to the consistent root of the switching regression, due to the misidentification 
of the regime operating in some periods. To correct the estimation bias we propose an 
adjustment in the algorithm, although ultimately the switching regression model should 
have a sufficiently good explanatory power and the error should be relatively stable so 
that the results obtained are consistent. 
Secondly, we address the problem of identifying the supply side of the industry when 
the data observed is the result of a system of supply and demand equations. We solve 
the identification problem by extending the rationality of the TSLS estimator to the 
maximization and expectation steps of the EM algorithm. 
Thirdly, we show that estimating a switching regression alone does not provide absolute 
evidence that the time series is composed by a mixture of collusive and competitive 
regimes. To test whether there are, indeed, structural breaks in data, we propose the 
implementation of the Jarque-Bera normality test for the residuals. If the null hypothesis 
is rejected, we conclude for the presence of structural breaks and we can then 
consistently estimate the supply curve as a switching regression. 
Most importantly, we believe the empirical methods presented in this chapter are easy 
to implement, computationally efficient and do not rely on much information a priori. 
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And so, they can be actually applied by competition authorities who face time and 
resources constrains. There is, of course, room for improving the empirical analysis of 
collusion. It would be useful if future research taught us, for example, how to deal with 
industries with differentiated products, firms with multiple products and more complex 
supply functions that account for other effects of collusion. Perhaps the continuous 
development of advanced econometric tools to detect collusion will turn competition 
authorities, over time, into real “collusive scene investigators”. 
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Appendices 
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Appendix A 
Theorem: under convex cost functions and concave and additive demand functions, the 
price of any firm at labor market   is increasing with the price of any firm at labor 
market A. 
Proof: the best reply function in equation (A.1) expresses the optimal price of any firm 
at labor market   as a function of the quantity produced, which in turn is a function of 
the prices of the whole industry: 
  
  
            
 
   
  
  
 
   
    
  
                                            
Define      as the following function: 
          
  
            
 
   
  
  
 
   
    
  
    
Using the implicit function theorem: 
   
 
   
   
     
   
 
     
   
 
  
 
             
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
    
  
   
 
   
    
 
    
    
    
  
             
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
    
  
   
 
   
  
    
    
    
  
Because the demand function is additive, 
    
 
   
    
  is null and the convexity of the cost 
function and the concavity of the demand function imply that 
   
 
   
  
             
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
    
    
    
  
             
 
   
  
   
 
   
  
  
  
   
 
   
  
    
    
    
    
and the assertion is complete.  
109 
 
From equation (A.1) it can be also concluded that the augment of   
  causes   
  to rise 
as well. Once a higher   
  increases the left-hand side and decreases the right-hand side 
of equation (A.1), the equality must be restored at a higher   
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Appendix B 
Theorem: under trigger strategies, as long as every firm is strictly better off when 
colluding, there are discount rates lower than one for which collusion can be sustained 
in equilibrium at every stage of an infinite super game. 
Proof: According to trigger strategies, each firm sets the collusive price or wage as long 
as all the other firms did so in the past stages and whether one of the firms deviates 
from the collusive path the whole industry reverts to the competitive equilibrium 
forever. Therefore collusion is only sustained in equilibrium if the long run gains of the 
cartel exceed the one shot gain from deviation, that is, if the following incentive 
compatibility constrain (ICC) is verified: 
   
    
  
 
   
   
    
                                                  
where   
  is the share of the profit of the cartel received by firm i,   
  is the profit of the 
punishment phase (equal to the competitive profit),   
  is the profit earned by firm   
when it is the only one deviating from the collusive path and   is the discount factor. 
The left-hand side of the ICC is the present value of all future gains of the cartel and the 
right-hand side of the equation is the one shot gain from deviation. Isolating the 
discount factor in equation (B.1) allows us to rewrite the incentive compatibility 
constraint as: 
  
  
    
 
  
    
                                                          
From equation (B.2) it is possible to conclude that if every firm earns strictly more 
under collusion than under competition    
    
  , there are discount factors lower 
than one for which informal collusion can be sustained in equilibrium.  
 
Theorem: under optimal penal codes there are always discount rates lower than one for 
which collusion can be sustained in equilibrium at every stage of an infinite super game. 
Proof: In order to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium, optimal penal codes must verify 
two incentive compatibility constraints. One the one hand, in the collusive subgames all 
firms must prefer to collude rather than to deviate and being punished afterwards: 
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where V is the present discounted value of the profits received in the punishment phase. 
On the other hand, all firms must prefer to accept the punishment rather than to deviate 
and have the punishment restarted. The ICC of the punishment subgames is thus given 
by: 
    
                                                                   
  
   is the profit earned when firm   deviates from the punishment phase. Equation 
(B.4) holds when the punishment is extremely severe in the first stage (“stick”) while in 
the following stages firms are rewarded by returning to the collusive path (“carrot”). 
The penal code is optimal when the present value of the profits earned in the 
punishment phase is as low as possible. Because firms can leave the market to avoid 
future losses, at the optimal (security level) penal code V is equal to zero and equation 
(B.3) is equivalent to: 
  
  
    
 
  
                                                                  
At last, from equation (B.5) we conclude that under optimal penal codes there are 
discount factors lower than one for which collusion can be sustained. 
We can further conclude by comparing equations (B.2) and (B.5) that the use of an 
optimal penal code instead of a trigger strategy also increases the set of discount rates 
for which collusion is possible. 
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Appendix C 
In this appendix we do comparative statics to prove that a positive variation in the wage 
that firm   offers to specialized workers has, in average, a negative impact on the price 
of the same firm and a positive or negative impact on the prices of the other firms, 
depending on the characteristics of the industry. In mathematical notation: 
      
   
                         
 
 
 
 
       
   
                     
      
   
                    
       
Along our proof we assume symmetry, because this result may not hold for every firm 
when companies are too different. To understand why we must use comparative statics 
to compute the two derivatives, remark that when firm   changes the wage paid to 
specialized workers in the first stage, this completely alters the equilibrium played in 
the second stage, in which firms choose different prices and levels of non specialized 
labor. Nevertheless, regardless of the wage fixed, firm   optimizes profits in the second 
stage and so the first order conditions given by equations (3.3.4) and (3.3.5) are always 
verified. In other words, the two following functions                    and 
                   remain constant and equal to zero, because any change in    is 
offset with changes in prices and    : 
                                    
 
    
   
 
            
   
    
                                                      
Using a generalization of the implicit function theorem for three variables, we can prove 
that: 
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Under symmetry: 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
         
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
   
   
         
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
     
 
Dividing every term by     gives 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
      
   
   
   
   
 
   
    
    
   
 
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
      
   
   
   
   
 
   
    
    
   
 
   
   
  
     
 
Solving for 
    
   
 : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
      
   
   
   
   
   
    
    
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
      
   
   
   
   
   
    
      
 
Equating the right-handed side of the two previous equations to eliminate 
    
   
 gives: 
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In the same way that firm   always optimizes individual profits in the second stage of 
the game for any   , the other firms of the industry do the same. Then the functions 
                   and                    also remain constant and equal to zero 
when the wage paid by firm   is changed. 
                                    
 
    
   
 
            
   
    
                                                      
Using the same reasoning as before: 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
      
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
   
   
      
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
      
 
Under symmetry, 
 
 
 
 
      
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
     
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
        
    
 
 
 
 
       
   
   
 
   
   
     
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
      
   
   
 
   
   
     
   
   
    
   
    
     
   
   
     
     
 
Dividing every term by     and solving for 
    
   
 gives: 
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Once again we eliminate 
    
   
 and get another equation relating 
   
   
 and 
   
   
: 
      
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
  
  
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
                       
The system of equations (C.1) and (C.2) can now be used to find 
   
   
 and 
   
   
. Solving 
equation (C.1) for 
   
   
: 
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
     
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
  
 
Solving equation (C.2) for 
   
   
 and applying symmetry: 
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Equating the two previous equations: 
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
  
       
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
 
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
 
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
  
  
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
  
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
    
      
   
    
   
   
 
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
   
 
Solving for 
   
   
: 
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It is possible to simplify this expression by factoring out the common factor: 
   
   
 
 
      
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
  
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
  
   
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
       
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
    
  
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
   
 
Dividing out now the factor 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 from the terms inside 
the straight parentheses: 
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Rearranging the terms in brackets: 
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From the signs of the partial derivatives of functions Ai and Bi given in Table 9 of 
Appendix D, it follows that the right handed side of equation (C.3) is negative and so 
we conclude that: 
   
   
    
To get a simplified expression for 
   
   
 we start by subtracting the terms in equation 
(C.1) to the terms in equation (C.2): 
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Solving for 
   
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
  
 
Replacing 
   
   
 by equation (C.3) and factoring out the two coefficients gives: 
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Rearranging the two last terms: 
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Eliminating the repeated terms in brackets: 
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Eliminating again the repeated terms: 
   
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
  
  
   
    
   
    
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
    
  
   
    
   
    
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
 
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
             
 
If once again we use the information provided in Table 9 (Appendix D), we verify that 
the sign of         is undetermined, as it depends on the relative dimension of the 
partial derivatives of functions Ai and Bi with respect to prices and wages. Nevertheless 
we can still analyze the expressions of the derivatives in Table 1 to identify the 
characteristics of the industry that are more likely to affect the sign of        .  
We conclude that for any     we have: 
 
 
 
 
       
   
                     
      
   
                    
   
where in type A industries 
      
   
 and 
      
   
 are sufficiently large relatively to 
      
   
 and 
      
   
, while in type B industries the opposite occurs.  
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Appendix D  
Derivative Value Sign 
   
   
  
      
   
       
    
   
 
       
   
     
   
   
 
      
   
       
    
   
 
       
      
    
   
   
      
   
   
 
      
   
 
     
   
       
    
   
  
       
   
       
       
      
     
   
    
   
      
   
       
      
 
 
    
   
 
 
    
   
   
   
      
   
       
       
      
   
 
    
   
 
 
    
   
   
   
      
   
       
       
      
   
 
    
   
 
 
    
   
   
      
   
   
   
      
   
       
       
     
   
 
    
   
 
 
    
   
   
 
      
   
    
   
   
 
      
   
    
   
   
      
   
   
 
     
   
    
   
    
  
      
    
    
   
   
  
      
   
      
   
    
   
   
  
      
   
      
   
    
   
   
      
   
   
  
      
   
     
   
    
 Table 9 – Partial derivatives  
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Appendix E 
Here we prove that when firms are symmetric the term  
      
   
      
   
   
    is always 
negative: 
 
      
   
      
   
   
   
 
      
   
 
      
   
      
      
   
   
 
      
   
 
      
   
      
      
   
  
 
Replacing            and            respectively by equations (C.3) and (C.4) in 
Appendix C: 
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Given the signs of the partial derivatives of functions A and B provided in Table 9 in 
Appendix D, we conclude that: 
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Appendix F 
In this appendix we show that 
  
   
 
   
   
 is negative in type B industries (industries 
where             ). 
  
   
 
   
   
            
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
 
   
   
  
      
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
 
   
   
  
 
Under symmetry: 
  
   
 
   
   
               
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
  
    
       
   
      
   
         
      
   
  
 
Using the fact that under symmetry 
     
   
 
      
   
      
      
   
 : 
  
   
 
   
   
               
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
  
    
       
   
      
   
     
     
   
 
      
   
   
 
Equation (3.4.1) can now be used to replace the term    
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Dividing out the common factor from the first and third terms: 
  
   
 
   
   
          
       
   
   
      
   
      
   
 
   
   
       
      
   
      
   
   
   
   
    
       
   
      
   
    
     
   
        
 
Applying symmetry and factoring out the common factor from the terms in brackets:  
  
   
 
   
   
  
          
       
   
 
      
   
      
      
   
       
      
   
      
      
   
    
    
       
   
      
   
    
     
   
        
 
          
       
   
 
      
   
      
      
   
      
      
   
   
    
       
   
      
   
    
     
   
        
 
The last expression is negative as long as 
      
   
      
      
   
  , which we also 
prove here using equations (C.3) and (C.4) from Appendix C:  
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Eliminating the repeated terms: 
      
   
      
      
   
  
 
 
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
  
   
   
    
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
    
130 
 
 
   
    
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
   
 
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
    
 
Given the information in Table 9 in Appendix D, the last expression for 
      
   
 
     
      
   
 is negative and hence 
  
   
 
   
   
 is negative in type B industries. 
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Appendix G 
We prove now that when all the firms of the industry increase the wage in the same 
amount at the first stage of the game, the best reply for any firm is to decrease the price 
at the second stage. Under symmetry, 
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The last equation can be simplified to: 
 
      
   
 
   
 
 
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
    
  
   
   
    
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
    
 
   
    
   
   
   
    
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
   
 
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
  
   
    
   
    
   
   
 
   
   
      
   
   
    
 
Given the sign of the derivatives in Table 9 in Appendix D, the last expression is 
negative and the assertion is complete. 
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Appendix H 
We provide in this appendix a formal demonstration that in type B industries the wages 
centrally determined under collusion are lower than the wages fixed at the simultaneous 
non-cooperative equilibrium. 
  
   
 
   
   
            
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
 
   
   
  
          
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
      
       
   
      
   
    
      
   
 
   
   
  
 
Under symmetry, 
  
   
 
   
   
               
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
  
          
       
   
  
      
   
      
   
   
   
    
       
   
      
   
         
      
   
  
 
Factoring out the common factor from the first and second terms and using the fact that 
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Substituting equation (3.7.1) in the last expression: 
  
   
 
   
   
          
       
   
   
      
   
      
   
   
   
       
      
   
      
   
   
   
   
    
       
   
      
   
    
     
   
        
 
Applying symmetry to the terms in brackets: 
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 is always negative (see Appendix F) and  
       
   
      
   
 
   is negative in type B industries, the differential 
  
   
 
   
   
 is also negative. It is hence 
proved that the wages fixed at the collusive equilibrium are lower than the ones 
determined at the simultaneous non-cooperative equilibrium. 
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Appendix I  
Matlab code for the traditional OLS EM algorithm 
 
function output = em0(DEP,INDS,IND) 
  
% Traditional OLS EM Algorithm 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% output = em0(DEP,INDS,IND,S) 
% DEP = Dependent variable vector 
% INDS = Switching independent variables vector 
% IND = Non-switching independent variables vector 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Example 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Supply equation: P = CMG + c(1)*S*Q + C(2)*(1-S)*Q + U2, 
%         where S is the unobserved state variable 
% 
% Command to estimate the supply equation as a switching regression: 
% output = em1(P,Q,CMG) 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Maximum number of iterations 
maxit = 100; 
  
% Dimensions 
T = size(DEP,1); 
k = 2*size(INDS,2)+size(IND,2); 
  
% Initial Values 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Note: OLS function is available in Appendix L 
ols=feval('ols',DEP,[INDS IND]); 
if mean(DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta)<median(DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta); 
    crit0 = 1-normcdf(ones(T,1)*prctile(DEP-[INDS IND]*... 
        ols.beta,25),DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta,sqrt(ols.sige)); 
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else 
    crit0 = 1-normcdf(ones(T,1)*prctile(DEP-[INDS IND]*... 
        ols.beta,75),DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta,sqrt(ols.sige)); 
end 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Creation of variables 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
W = zeros(T,maxit); 
Shat = zeros(T,maxit); 
lambda = zeros(1,maxit); 
beta = zeros(k,maxit); 
sigma = zeros(1,maxit); 
r2 = zeros(1,maxit); 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% First iteration 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
iter = 1; 
% Expectation step 
W(:,1) = crit0; 
Shat(W(:,1)>0.5,1) = 1; 
lambda(1) = sum(W(:,1))/T; 
% Maximization step 
ols=feval('ols',DEP,[INDS.*W(:,1) INDS.*(1-W(:,1)) IND]); 
beta(:,1) = ols.beta; 
sigma(1) = ols.sige; 
r2(1) = ols.rsqr; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Second and remaining iterations 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
crit=0; 
while  crit < 0.99999; 
    iter = iter+1; 
    % Expectation step 
    h0 = normpdf(DEP,[zeros(T,1) INDS IND]*beta(:,iter-1),... 
        sqrt(sigma(1,iter-1))); 
    h1 = normpdf(DEP,[INDS zeros(T,1) IND]*beta(:,iter-1),... 
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        sqrt(sigma(1,iter-1))); 
    W(:,iter) = lambda(iter-1)*h1 ./ ( lambda(iter-1)*h1 +... 
        (1-lambda(iter-1))*h0 ); 
    Shat(W(:,iter)>0.5,iter) = 1; 
    lambda(iter) = sum(W(:,iter))/T; 
    % Maximization Step 
    ols = feval('ols',DEP,[INDS.*W(:,iter) INDS.*(1-W(:,iter)) IND]); 
    beta(:,iter) = ols.beta; 
    sigma(iter) = ols.sige; 
    r2(iter) = ols.rsqr; 
    crit = corr( W(:,iter) , W(:,iter-1) ); 
    if iter == maxit; 
        warning('em: maximum number of iterations exceeded.'); 
        break 
    end 
end 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Function outputs 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Conditional probability of collusion 
output.W = W(:,iter); 
% Prediction of the regime 
output.Shat = Shat(:,iter); 
% Unconditional probability of collusion 
output.lambda = lambda(:,iter); 
% Estimated coefficients 
output.beta = beta(:,iter); 
% Estimated standard deviation of the error 
output.sigma = sigma(iter); 
% R-squared 
output.r2 = r2(iter); 
% Historical estimates obtained until convergence 
output.HW = W(:,1:iter); 
output.HShat = Shat(:,1:iter); 
output.Hlambda = lambda(:,1:iter); 
output.Hbeta = beta(:,1:iter); 
output.Hsigma = sigma(1:iter); 
output.Hr2 = r2(1:iter); 
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% Start value for the conditional probability of collusion  
output.crit0 = crit0; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Appendix J  
Matlab code for the new OLS EM algorithm 
 
function output = em1(DEP,INDS,IND) 
  
% New OLS EM Algorithm 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% output = em1(DEP,INDS,IND,S) 
% DEP = Dependent variable vector 
% INDS = Switching independent variables vector 
% IND = Non-switching independent variables vector 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Example 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Supply equation: P = CMG + c(1)*S*Q + C(2)*(1-S)*Q + U2, 
%         where S is the unobserved state variable 
% 
% Command to estimate the supply equation as a switching regression: 
% output = em1(P,Q,CMG) 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Maximum number of iterations 
maxit = 100; 
  
% Dimensions 
T = size(DEP,1); 
k = 2*size(INDS,2)+size(IND,2); 
  
% Initial Values 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Note: OLS function is available in Appendix L 
ols=feval('ols',DEP,[INDS IND]); 
if mean(DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta)<median(DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta); 
    crit0 = 1-normcdf(ones(T,1)*prctile(DEP-[INDS IND]*... 
        ols.beta,25),DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta,sqrt(ols.sige)); 
else 
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    crit0 = 1-normcdf(ones(T,1)*prctile(DEP-[INDS IND]*... 
        ols.beta,75),DEP-[INDS IND]*ols.beta,sqrt(ols.sige)); 
end 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Creation of variables 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
W = zeros(T,maxit); 
Shat = zeros(T,maxit); 
lambda = zeros(1,maxit); 
beta = zeros(k,maxit); 
sigma = zeros(1,maxit); 
r2 = zeros(1,maxit); 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% First iteration 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
iter = 1; 
% Expectation step 
W(:,1) = crit0; 
Shat(W(:,1)>0.5,1) = 1; 
lambda(1) = sum(W(:,1))/T; 
% Maximization step 
ols=feval('ols',DEP,[INDS.*Shat(:,1) INDS.*(1-Shat(:,1)) IND]); 
beta(:,1) = ols.beta; 
sigma(1) = ols.sige; 
r2(1) = ols.rsqr; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Second and remaining iterations 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
crit=0; 
while  crit < 0.99999; 
    iter = iter+1; 
    % Expectation step 
    h0 = normpdf(DEP,[zeros(T,1) INDS IND]*beta(:,iter-1),... 
        sqrt(sigma(1,iter-1))); 
    h1 = normpdf(DEP,[INDS zeros(T,1) IND]*beta(:,iter-1),... 
        sqrt(sigma(1,iter-1))); 
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    W(:,iter) = lambda(iter-1)*h1 ./ ( lambda(iter-1)*h1 +... 
        (1-lambda(iter-1))*h0 ); 
    Shat(W(:,iter)>0.5,iter) = 1; 
    lambda(iter) = sum(W(:,iter))/T; 
    % Maximization Step 
    ols = feval('ols',DEP,[INDS.*Shat(:,iter)... 
        INDS.*(1-Shat(:,iter)) IND]); 
    beta(:,iter) = ols.beta; 
    sigma(iter) = ols.sige; 
    r2(iter) = ols.rsqr; 
    crit = corr( W(:,iter) , W(:,iter-1) ); 
    if iter == maxit; 
        warning('em: maximum number of iterations exceeded.'); 
        break 
    end 
end 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Function outputs 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Conditional probability of collusion 
output.W = W(:,iter); 
% Prediction of the regime 
output.Shat = Shat(:,iter); 
% Unconditional probability of collusion 
output.lambda = lambda(:,iter); 
% Estimated coefficients 
output.beta = beta(:,iter); 
% Estimated standard deviation of the error 
output.sigma = sigma(iter); 
% R-squared 
output.r2 = r2(iter); 
% Historical estimates obtained until convergence 
output.HW = W(:,1:iter); 
output.HShat = Shat(:,1:iter); 
output.Hlambda = lambda(:,1:iter); 
output.Hbeta = beta(:,1:iter); 
output.Hsigma = sigma(1:iter); 
output.Hr2 = r2(1:iter); 
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% Start value for the conditional probability of collusion  
output.crit0 = crit0; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix K  
Matlab code for the TSLS EM algorithm  
function output = em2(DEP,ENDS,EXO,IV) 
  
% TSLS EM Algorithm 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% output = em2(DEP,ENDS,EXO,IV,S) 
% DEP = Dependent variable vector 
% ENDS = Switching endogenous variables vector 
% EXO = Exogenous variables vector 
% IV = Instrumental variables 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Example 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% System of equations: 
% Demand: Q = c(1) + c(2)*Y + c(3)*P + U1  
% Supply: P = CMG + c(4)*S*Q + C(5)*(1-S)*Q + U2, 
%         where S is the unobserved state variable 
% 
% Command to estimate the supply as a switching regression: 
% output = em2(P,Q,CMG,[C Y]) 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Maximum number of iterations 
maxit = 200; 
  
% Dimensions 
T = size(DEP,1); 
k = 2*size(ENDS,2); 
g = size(EXO,2); 
  
% Initial Values 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Note: OLS function is available in Appendix L 
ols1 = feval('ols',ENDS,[EXO IV]); 
ols2 = feval('ols',DEP,[ols1.yhat EXO]); 
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beta0 = ols2.beta; 
DEPHAT0 = [ENDS EXO]*beta0; 
sigma0 = (DEP-DEPHAT0)'*(DEP-DEPHAT0)/(T-k-g); 
if mean(DEP-[ENDS EXO]*beta0)<median(DEP-[ENDS EXO]*beta0); 
    crit0 = 1-normcdf(ones(T,1)*prctile(DEP-[ENDS EXO]*... 
        beta0,25),DEP-[ENDS EXO]*beta0,sqrt(sigma0)); 
else 
    crit0 = 1-normcdf(ones(T,1)*prctile(DEP-[ENDS EXO]*... 
        beta0,75),DEP-[ENDS EXO]*beta0,sqrt(sigma0)); 
end 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Creation of variables 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
W = zeros(T,maxit); 
Shat = zeros(T,maxit); 
lambda = zeros(1,maxit); 
beta = zeros(k+g,maxit); 
ENDSHAT0 = zeros(T,maxit); 
ENDSHAT1 = zeros(T,maxit); 
DEPHAT = zeros(T,maxit); 
DEPHAT0 = zeros(T,maxit); 
DEPHAT1 = zeros(T,maxit); 
sigma = zeros(1,maxit); 
r2 = zeros(1,maxit); 
sigma0 = zeros(1,maxit); 
sigma1 = zeros(1,maxit); 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% First iteration 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
iter=1; 
% Expectation step 
W(:,1) = crit0; 
Shat(W(:,1)>0.5,1)=1; 
lambda(1) = sum(W(:,1))/T; 
% Maximization step 
ols1 = feval('ols',ENDS,[EXO IV repmat(Shat(:,1),1,... 
    size(EXO,2)).*EXO repmat(Shat(:,1),1,size(IV,2)).*IV]); 
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ols2 = feval('ols',DEP,[ols1.yhat.*Shat(:,1)... 
    ols1.yhat.*(1-Shat(:,1)) EXO]); 
beta(:,1) = ols2.beta; 
DEPHAT(:,1) = [ENDS.*Shat(:,1) ENDS.*(1-Shat(:,1)) EXO]*beta(:,1); 
sigma(1) = (DEP-DEPHAT(:,1))'*(DEP-DEPHAT(:,1))/(T-k-g); 
r2(1) = 1 - ( (DEP-DEPHAT(:,1))'*(DEP-DEPHAT(:,1)) ) /... 
    ( (DEP-mean(DEP))'*(DEP-mean(DEP)) ); 
ENDSHAT0(:,1) = [EXO IV zeros(T,size(EXO,2)).*EXO... 
    zeros(T,size(IV,2)).*IV] * ols1.beta;     
ENDSHAT1(:,1) = [EXO IV ones(T,size(EXO,2)).*EXO... 
    ones(T,size(IV,2)).*IV] * ols1.beta; 
DEPHAT0(:,1) = [zeros(T,1) ENDSHAT0(:,1) EXO]*beta(:,1); 
DEPHAT1(:,1) = [ENDSHAT1(:,1) zeros(T,1) EXO]*beta(:,1); 
sigma0(1) = (DEP.*(1-Shat(:,1))-DEPHAT0(:,1).*(1-Shat(:,1)))'*... 
    (DEP.*(1-Shat(:,1))-DEPHAT0(:,1).*(1-Shat(:,1)))/... 
    (T-sum(Shat(:,1))-k/2-g); 
sigma1(1) = (DEP.*Shat(:,1)-DEPHAT1(:,1).*Shat(:,1))'*... 
    (DEP.*Shat(:,1)-DEPHAT1(:,1).*Shat(:,1))/(sum(Shat(:,1))-k/2-g); 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Second and remaining iterations 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
crit=0; 
while  crit < 0.99999; 
    iter = iter+1; 
    % Expectation step 
    h0 = normpdf(DEP,[zeros(T,1) ENDSHAT0(:,iter-1) EXO]*... 
        beta(:,iter-1),sqrt(sigma0(iter-1))); 
    h1 = normpdf(DEP,[ENDSHAT1(:,iter-1) zeros(T,1) EXO]*... 
        beta(:,iter-1),sqrt(sigma1(iter-1))); 
    W(:,iter) = lambda(iter-1)*h1 ./ ( lambda(iter-1)*h1 +... 
        (1-lambda(iter-1))*h0 ); 
    Shat(W(:,iter)>0.5,iter) = 1; 
    lambda(iter) = sum(W(:,iter))/T; 
    % Maximization Step 
    ols1 = feval('ols',ENDS,[EXO IV repmat(Shat(:,iter),1,... 
        size(EXO,2)).*EXO repmat(Shat(:,iter),1,size(IV,2)).*IV]); 
    ols2 = feval('ols',DEP,[ols1.yhat.*Shat(:,iter) ols1.yhat.*... 
        (1-Shat(:,iter)) EXO]); 
146 
 
    beta(:,iter) = ols2.beta; 
    DEPHAT(:,iter) = [ENDS.*Shat(:,iter)... 
        ENDS.*(1-Shat(:,iter)) EXO]*beta(:,iter); 
    sigma(iter) = (DEP-DEPHAT(:,iter))'*... 
        (DEP-DEPHAT(:,iter))/(T-k-g); 
    r2(iter) = 1-( (DEP-DEPHAT(:,iter))'*(DEP-DEPHAT(:,iter)) ) /... 
        ( (DEP-mean(DEP))'*(DEP-mean(DEP)) ); 
    ENDSHAT0(:,iter) = [EXO IV zeros(T,size(EXO,2)).*EXO... 
        zeros(T,size(IV,2)).*IV] * ols1.beta;     
    ENDSHAT1(:,iter) = [EXO IV ones(T,size(EXO,2)).*EXO... 
        ones(T,size(IV,2)).*IV] * ols1.beta; 
    DEPHAT0(:,iter) = [zeros(T,1) ENDSHAT0(:,iter) EXO]*beta(:,iter); 
    DEPHAT1(:,iter) = [ENDSHAT1(:,iter) zeros(T,1) EXO]*beta(:,iter); 
    sigma0(iter) = (DEP.*(1-Shat(:,iter))-DEPHAT0(:,iter).*... 
        (1-Shat(:,iter)))'*(DEP.*(1-Shat(:,iter))-DEPHAT0(:,iter)... 
        .*(1-Shat(:,iter)))/(T-sum(Shat(:,iter))-k/2-g); 
    sigma1(iter) = (DEP.*Shat(:,iter)-DEPHAT1(:,iter).*... 
        Shat(:,iter))'*(DEP.*Shat(:,iter)-DEPHAT1(:,iter).*... 
        Shat(:,iter))/(sum(Shat(:,iter))-k/2-g); 
    crit = corr( W(:,iter) , W(:,iter-1) ); 
    if iter == maxit; 
        warning('em: maximum number of iterations exceeded.'); 
        break 
    end 
end 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Function outputs 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% Conditional probability of collusion 
output.W=W(:,iter); 
% Prediction of the regime 
output.Shat=Shat(:,iter); 
% Unconditional probability of collusion 
output.lambda=lambda(:,iter); 
% Estimated coefficients 
output.beta=beta(:,iter); 
% Estimated standard deviation of the error 
output.sigma=sigma(iter); 
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% R-squared 
output.r2 = r2(iter); 
% Historical estimates obtained until convergence 
output.HW=W(:,1:iter); 
output.HShat=Shat(:,1:iter); 
output.Hlambda=lambda(:,1:iter); 
output.Hbeta=beta(:,1:iter); 
output.Hsigma=sigma(:,1:iter); 
output.Hr2 = r2(1:iter); 
% Start value for the conditional probability of collusion  
output.crit0=crit0; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
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Appendix L  
Matlab code for the OLS estimator 
 
function output=ols(y,x) 
  
% OLS Estimator 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
% output = ols(y,x) 
% y = Dependent variable vector 
% x =  independent variables vector 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Errors 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
if (nargin ~= 2); error('Wrong # of arguments to ols');  
else 
 [nobs,nvar] = size(x); [nobs2,~] = size(y); 
 if (nobs ~= nobs2); error('x and y must have same # obs in ols');  
 end; 
end; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Matrix inv(x'x) 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
if nobs < 10000 
  [~,r] = qr(x,0); 
  xpxi = (r'*r)\eye(nvar); 
else 
  xpxi = (x'*x)\eye(nvar); 
end; 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
  
% Function output 
%--------------------------------------------------- 
output.meth = 'ols'; 
% Dependent variable 
output.y = y; 
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% Number of observations 
output.nobs = nobs; 
% Number of variables 
output.nvar = nvar; 
% Estimated coefficients 
output.beta = xpxi*(x'*y); 
% Fitted dependent variable 
output.yhat = x*output.beta; 
% Residual 
output.resid = y - output.yhat; 
sigu = output.resid'*output.resid; 
% Estimated variance of the error 
output.sige = sigu/(nobs-nvar); 
tmp = (output.sige)*(diag(xpxi)); 
sigb=sqrt(tmp); 
% Standard deviation of the estimators 
output.bstd = sigb; 
tcrit=-tdis_inv(.025,nobs); 
% 5% confidence intervals 
output.bint=[output.beta-tcrit.*sigb, output.beta+tcrit.*sigb]; 
% T-statistics 
output.tstat = output.beta./(sqrt(tmp)); 
ym = y - mean(y); 
rsqr1 = sigu; 
rsqr2 = ym'*ym; 
% R-squared 
output.rsqr = 1.0 - rsqr1/rsqr2;  
rsqr1 = rsqr1/(nobs-nvar); 
rsqr2 = rsqr2/(nobs-1.0); 
if rsqr2 ~= 0 
% Rbar-squared 
output.rbar = 1 - (rsqr1/rsqr2); 
else 
    output.rbar = output.rsqr; 
end; 
ediff = output.resid(2:nobs) - output.resid(1:nobs-1); 
% Durbin-watson 
output.dw = (ediff'*ediff)/sigu;  
%--------------------------------------------------- 
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